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PSYCHOLOGIES OF TO-DAY: A REVIEW OF THE FIELD.

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A RECENT American publication "Psychologies of 1930" has a significant title. Apparently we cannot speak of the science of "Psychology" as we would of other sciences such as Biology and Botany. The fact is that in Psychology there exist so many schools each contending over a settled subject matter, over various theories concerning the mental processes and behaviour of the individual, over philosophic or metaphysical speculations acting as a background to a theory, and over suitable methods of attack, that it is little wonder if the earnest student of the subject should pause uneasily and wonder where he precisely stands with regard to the subject. In spite of the irresistible march of progress that has been made in the science among the contending schools from Moscow to New York, yet one feels, without being unduly pessimistic, that certain problems will remain unsolved because they appear unsolvable, especially in regard to the body-mind riddle. We say for example that mental life is awakened by the perception of a certain object, but just where the physical processes concerning ether waves, chemical changes in sense organs, nerves and brain ends and where psychic life begins is shrouded in darkness. One school gets over the difficulty simply by bluntly declaring that no such thing as consciousness exists since such "mental" phenomena have not yet been proved. So in these days the citadel of this central problem is stormed on all sides by a welter of descriptions, analyses and hypotheses. The majority of these, happily to relate, overlap and intertwine to an agreeably surprising extent. It is in this respect that we may hopefully expect one day to speak of Psychology in the singular instead of in the plural. Even at present, in spite of the hostile schools, a certain solidarity exists. We may regard the present state of the science, as Woodworth says, merely as a symptom of adolescence, and realize that all the schools are attempting something sincere, and that the total group is wiser than its individual members.

It is impossible in this article to attempt anything like a detailed account of the theories of the various schools. By a brief consideration of the views of representatives of these schools, however, we can obtain a conception of the most important principles underlying them.

A vital difference exists between those who accept in the subject matter of their psychology such concepts as consciousness, purpose and experience, and those who deny mentalism outright. Between these two schools there is no compromise. Hunter, who supports the latter group, usually known as behaviourists, of which Watson is the outstanding exponent, prefers the name Anthroponomy for his system, a science of human behaviour which deals with everything that can be shown to be present in or to influence human behaviour. It has no philosophy and rejects mentalism as its data and introspection as a method. Hunter contends that psychologists nowhere prove that mental phenomena exist. They merely assert that fact. They say that red or middle C are mental because they are different from light or sound waves. Water, says Hunter, is different from hydrogen and oxygen. Is water therefore mental? His method is observation and experiment. Observable facts are considered to be the only reliable data. Man is studied as his experimental material just as a geologist studies rocks in order to ascertain certain laws pertaining to them.

Not a few criticisms have been levelled by psychologists against the extreme behaviourist school. They insist on admitting experience as well as behaviour as a characteristic of the individual. Woodworth states that in their desire to rid psychology of supernaturalism and to make it more scientific, the behaviourists started with fruitful studies of the behaviour of animals and wished to extend this line of study to the human subject. Hence their conclusion that all behaviour data including the emotions consisted in muscular and glandular activity. Köhler found the Stimulus-Response (S-R) psychology of the behaviourists quite inadequate to explain the behaviour of apes on which he carried out many very interesting experiments. He postulates "insight" as an x in the formula $S-x-R$ which resembles the $S-c-R$ formula of the academic psychologists where c stands for consciousness.

Akin to this doctrine of material monism are some of the Russian psychologies. Pavlov after thirty years of research claims that the total external as well as the internal activity of a higher animal can be studied with complete success from a purely physiological angle, that is, in terms chiefly of the nervous system. As a result of his experiments he formulated his well-known principle of the "conditioned reflex" in which an animal responds by a food reaction such as salivation to an artificial (conditioned) stimulus to which it had never responded before

if such a stimulus precedes a natural stimulus such as food that ordinarily excites this reaction. This does not occur in animals deprived of the cerebral hemispheres. Pavlov's experiment throws important light on the problem of association and on the fact that there is interaction and reciprocal influence between the cortical and sub-cortical centres. His other conclusions are that a strongly excited centre in the brain in some manner attracts toward itself every other weaker excitation reaching the system simultaneously; that an excitation of the same cell lasting only a few minutes leads to the development in it of a process of inhibition which decreases its work and finally stops it altogether; that this inhibition has a tendency to spread in the cortex; that inhibition is also caused by a stimulus that is too intense or by stimuli that are too numerous; and that the cortical cells need periods of rest in order to recuperate.

Schniermann in expounding the works of Bektirev substitutes the name "associated reflex" for Pavlov's "conditioned reflex" as the result of experiments modified to suit the conditions of human beings. Schniermann's school, the Reflexological School, studies the whole of human behaviour from an objective point of view, and regards the reflex as the creative factor of individuality. The "so-called" instincts are classified as organic reflexes, and instinctive actions are considered due not only to innate but also to acquired reflexes. It studies human personality in its outer manifestations as a product of the biological and social environment, and builds up a system of objective correlations existing between the personality and the environment. The psychic side of personality is not utterly discarded but is regarded as an accumulation in the cortex of outer energy which has been transformed by the receptors. The receptors are thus transformers of outer energy. Such accumulated energy discharges into the so-called mental processes of perception and thought. Environment thus plays a most important part in accounting for the reflex nature of human activity.

Directly opposed to these schools are the majority of psychologists who postulate the existence of consciousness and immediate experience as a reality, though they differ as to its nature. Such psychologists by no means exclude the study of behaviour from their subject matter. They study both subjective experience and objective behaviour. In this respect we welcome Woodworth's definition of psychology which covers the work of all schools. According to this definition psychology is the study of the *activities* of the individual leaving physiology for the study of parts and sociology for the study of groups of individuals. The word "activity" subsumes the two concepts of experience and behaviour. Psychologists today study the individual as a whole; and many, as in the case of Bentley,

formulate their theories in terms which attempt to break down the distinction between the outer and the inner. In spite of this general position, however, the work of a great many psychologists has a different emphasis. Some, such as the structuralists, are more directly concerned with the description of the mental processes or the content of consciousness. They attempt to describe these by means of experimental methods in terms of their analytic elements. Out of this movement have grown many schools of experimental psychology, many of which differ in their findings, but all being concerned with much the same problems. Modern structuralism, however, differs from the older Structuralist school in that it does not attempt formal analysis of the mind into fixed sensory elements, but deals with structured wholes built up on behavioural as well as phenomenal terms.

On the other hand certain psychologists, belonging to the Functionalist school, are not content to stop at this point, but are concerned in addition with the relations between the individual and the environment. This school deals with the way in which the mind mediates between the environment and the needs of the organism and is thus practical and utilitarian in spirit and interest. For this reason it is naturally interested in applied psychology in the field of education, industry and in abnormal psychology.

From the structuralist's point of view psychological experience is described as coming to us in patterns consisting of closely-woven variables. Such patterns vary from one experience to another. For example, in vision, size, form, hue constitute some of the variables; in hearing, intensity, pitch, volume. "Sensation" is regarded as a placing together or arrangement of such variables, called in this case the attributes of the sensation which form these definite patterns. Some psychologists account for such variables through the functions of the sense organs, though opinions differ concerning this. The sense organs are supposed to initiate series of impulses over the individual insulated fibres which carry the impulses to the central nervous system. In this central station an additive process of some nature appears to take place which represents the object sensed. It is generally agreed, however, as Nafe points out, that our ordinary meaningful experiences involve something more than the mere adding of sensations together. Throughout life we appear to have a continuous stream of experiences. These experiences appear to organize themselves into what are called concepts and percepts. In memory such previous experiences recur, and in their reappearance seem to be reassembled according to some principle of organization or association which makes of them related units or wholes. There is much speculation as to the process by which "meaning"

accompanies our sensory impressions. Titchener says that meaning psychologically is always mental context, that is, secondary sensations or images which are grouped round the sensory core of the experience to form a pattern. In this way he appears to stress the additive process almost to the exclusion of arrangement and organization. The truth is that the nature of this principle of association and organization, that is, the functional activity of the cortex, is not really known, though much work is being done by the experimental schools of psychology in this direction. Much then is still needed to explain this problem concerning experience, to explain how past and present experience are so closely woven, and to establish the true relations between stimulus conditions, neural activity and psychological experience.

An important advance in dealing with this problem has been made by the Gestalt school of psychology. Köhler rejects outright the method of analysing experience into sensations and the stressing of the principle of association to account for meanings. The basic principle of perception, according to Köhler, is that of organization. Association is just an after effect of organized processes, and therefore *depends* on organization and takes a secondary place. Perception cannot be entirely explained on the principle of independent sensory elements. We perceive an object as a whole and it is the rôle of *relations* existing between the sensory data experienced that plays a vital part, for example, the relations between figure, ground, form, and time relations. In perception we must take into account how local conditions for the whole field relate to each other. He illustrates his principles clearly and definitely from the study of several figures in the formation of easily-perceived groups. The properties of these figures in colour and form, their relation to each other concerning the enclosure of space, the ground on which they are perceived, the relation of these to what has just previously been received—all these local conditions are perceived as a whole. This principle of organization is further elaborated by Koffka who shows that we perceive figures in three dimensions, not two, as Berkeley maintains, as a primary fact, that is, as a result of spontaneous organization of the visual field. To account for this spontaneous organization Köhler attempts an hypothesis to explain his principles in neurological terms. He shows that there may be transverse connection between the longitudinal conductors of the optic nerve accounting for dynamic intercourse in the total optic process. Nafe considers, however, that the neurological facts support the present theories rather more than they do Köhler's theory.

Köhler's principles have found fairly general acceptance by other psychologists though some maintain that he has merely

made explicit what has previously been implicit in psychological theory, and that his findings do not merit the name of a separate school. Even so, Gestalt psychology bids fair to influence us largely in revising our theories of learning. Our best teachers may fairly claim to have already recognized implicitly in the class-room the concept of organization under the stress of the total situation. Gestalt psychology will certainly lead to an explicit recognition of this principle. Objective situations, such as furniture arranged irregularly in a room, may appear in very different organizations to an observer according to his interests, past experience and actual position in the room. So in the class-room the subject matter presented by the teacher to whom the organization is perfectly clear, since he has arranged and presented it himself, may appear in totally different organizations in the minds of the pupils. When a pupil with sudden insight exclaims: "Oh, that's the point", and is able forthwith to demonstrate the problem himself, we assume with Köhler that the right *organization* has supervened rather than the stamping in of a connection between stimulus and response. A similar sudden mastery of a problem by apes was revealed during Köhler's experiments with these animals. The same principle is seen in learning by imitation. Some apes failed to solve the problem presented, such as the obtaining of food under specially arranged conditions, because they observed only *single* phases, and not parts related to the essential structure of the situation. So in school the pupil has to furnish something from *his* side, an insight with accents on the right place for the necessary organization.

While on this point we may consider a very interesting configurational psychology expressed by Sander. He also rejects all attempts to explain the constitution of experience, be it a figure, a perception, a volition or a thought process, out of its parts. He emphasizes the *totality* of experience for the explanation of our actual experiences and attitudes. For this totality, however, we must look beyond immediate experience and conscious phenomena to the non-conscious realms in search of that process "now tempestuously, now calmly unfolding, which is the symphony of living experience". The recognition of the existence of this transphenomenal psychic reality is necessary to explain the problems of personality, emotional life and mental development, and therefore for the nature of perception with which Gestalt psychology deals. This totality of experience may be called *structure* but it is not synonymous with Gestalt. The content of experience at any time is always this structured whole containing subordinate wholes, all more or less distinct from each other, but having a connectedness with each other and with the general system, the greater totality. The study of configurations as explained by Köhler should never

be content to regard in isolation the structure that happens to be evident at the moment, but should pass beyond to include the totality of the conscious field ; for the subordinate units or configurations always remain embedded in the more comprehensive experiential totality. The totality is experienced as states of mind and plays a dominant rôle in emotional life. Its emotionally tinged nature is especially seen when configurations presented are quite different from what the dispositional conditions are adjusted to meet, as when a picture hung crookedly on a wall fairly shrieks to be placed as we are accustomed to see it—the totality in this case requiring a configuration of the perceptual field. Gestalt cannot neglect these emotionally active totality properties. The dynamics of structure explained above are realized not only by these external conditions, but they strive also from within, creative in their own right. The joy of regularity of construction seen in childish games of building and moulding, the regularity of design performed by adults in their scribbles on pads and telephone boxes, the ornamentation of savages, the essentially organized and patterned nature of human motions as seen in the rhythm and swing of their savage dances all testify to this fact. Sander further uses the above principles in his explanation of personality : The totality as well as the various subordinate wholes may have a loosely organized structure. The quality of the totality is determined by these sub-wholes which in themselves have various degrees of importance. They seldom chime together in organic unity with the totality. If the balance of the total structure is disturbed because of one sub-structure, for example the sexual impulse, dominating the rest, remorse may result. But joy comes when the sub-structures creatively assert themselves in harmony with the whole.

So far we have dealt chiefly with the structure of the mental processes and its associated problems. Another problem growing out of this concerns the mechanism through which the mental processes themselves are developed. An hypothesis put forward by Dunlap assigns the source and basis of mental differences not to the brain, which is usually considered to occupy the throne, but to the periphery, that is, to receptors, muscles and glands that lie outside the brain. The brain is conceived as having one function only, that is, integration. Dunlap considers it futile to look to inherent brain capacities or potentialities for the explanation of individual mental differences. For practical purposes any healthy brain is potentially equal to any other healthy brain as far as mental processes are concerned. The brain commences to be trained from birth. The limits, as well as the details of this training are set, not by brain limitations nor by the environment alone, but by the action of the environment as mediated or transformed by the peripheral organs and

tissues. In different environments the same organism would respond in different ways and therefore receive different training. In the same environment two organisms with different peripheral mechanisms, but with brains initially alike, would receive different training. If these two brains, however, initially alike, had the *same* peripheral mechanisms, and were subject to the *same* environment, there would be no difference in mental development between them. Psychology, then, should study more closely such peripheral differences. In a similar way Dunlap deals with emotions and the affective states. He substitutes the name "appet" for the affective states as the basis of his theory of desire, and regards "appets" as experiential facts which are not "central" but which depend on the excitation of visceral receptors. That is, he brings "appets" out into the periphery.

Spearman's Factor Theory, derived not from mere theoretical speculation but from research extending over a long period, is an important contribution to psychology concerning the mental processes. It is impossible in this article to develop his theories and their associated laws. Suffice it to say that the "G" factor represents a kind of general ability which remains always the same in all the abilities of the same individual but which varies in different individuals. It is perhaps a kind of energy in the cortex which is distributed in various proportions to the varying constituents of the brain, and which may or may not be synonymous with the concept generally spoken of as "intelligence". The "S" factor differs from one ability to the other even in the same individual. It represents the specific factors, that is, the "engines" in the different parts or constituents of the brain that have special functions. These "engines" are supplied by the general energy of the cortex. Three other general factors dealt with by Spearman are: "P", the inertia of this energy on transfer from one "engine" to another; "O", the unsteadiness of the supply of this energy—probably a manifestation of fatigue; and "W", some additional agency accounting for consistency of action resulting from volition or will. These four general factors, "G", "P", "O", "W", would appear to achieve mental analysis over a very wide region. Spearman's hope for the future is that the Factor Theory will unite the discordant schools of psychology.

We may now turn to some psychological theories that have more particularly a philosophic bearing. Many psychologists emphatically claim that philosophic speculations can have no place in scientific psychology. Kornilov, however, claims that the task of psychology, as with other sciences, is not merely to collect facts, and that sooner or later a philosophic analysis of fundamental conceptions on which the science works becomes a necessity.

Consider first the Hormic psychology as represented by McDougall. He is the exponent of purposive psychology which is directly opposed to any mechanistic explanation of behaviour. It is of a teleological nature, that is, it deals with final causes, with the conception of design as a true cause for a thing's existence. The essence of the Hormic psychology is that animals seek certain goals because it is their nature to do so. These goals or ends are not determined by the previous experience of the organism, though the striving after these goals is often modified by experience. McDougall supports instincts outright as the prime movers of human activity. Instincts appear to be out of fashion with many writers today, especially by those belonging to the more mechanistic schools. These instincts, according to McDougall, are an unknown quantity which he does not pretend to explain. They are some sort of potential energy which arise out of a primal urge to live, and which direct the organism to the attainment of certain goals for that purpose. Where there is life there is mind. Life and mind have emerged from an inorganic realm which could not itself have been mindless and lifeless. McDougall claims through his theory to account for a continuous organic evolution both physically and mentally, in which differentiation and specialization of structure took place to enable the organism to attain its ends. The intelligent striving of the organism is the creative activity to which evolution is due. The cognitive power which evolved along with this primal urge to live, to be active, to seek, is everywhere the servant and the guide of this striving of the organism. In this way almost blind striving evolved into vague foresight of the desired ends, and culminated through specialized cognitive structures to adequate long-range foresight which in humans is purposive activity in the fullest sense of the word. The words "horme" and "hormic" have been used by Professor Nunn to cover both the conscious purposeful activity of man and the blind striving of the lower organisms. McDougall's account of the sentiments is no less important. They are the true functional systems of the developed mind. As these develop, the original hormic impulses are obscured by the further differentiation into new and specialized goals. The sentiments become organized into one comprehensive system, that is, character; and, if harmoniously integrated under the authority of the self-regarding sentiment, they can override the crude promptings of instincts and engender the highest manifestations of personality. On this latter point we are reminded of a similar view already mentioned in considering the work of Sander.

Kornilov deals with the philosophical bases of Marxism which are known by the name of Dialectic Materialism. This philosophy emphasizes the primacy of matter. Matter is nothing but nature. It is not the product of consciousness but

exists independently of consciousness, and gives us the content of consciousness. Matter has different shapes and forms known only in movement, since movement is the principal form of existence and covers all changes and processes going on in the universe. This movement of matter is seen in light and heat, chemical combinations and life itself, that is, it consists not only in transposition but also in qualitative changes. Matter being primordial, preceded consciousness. Consciousness appeared only when the organization of matter reached a fairly high degree. Primary and loosely organized matter is characterized only by physical and chemical reactions. As the composition of matter became more complicated it adopted a cellular structure and there appeared reactions of a different kind, that is, organic reactions which are manifested in living creatures with highly organized nervous systems as consciousness, thought, psyche. Thought and consciousness therefore are the highest products of a special form of organized matter, and in the living organism there is nothing except matter. Consciousness shows itself in the fact that the various physiological processes taking place in the living organism, apart from finding their external objective expression in motion, also find a subjective expression in thought, feeling, desire. Consciousness does not give its contents to existence, but borrows its contents from the outside world which it reflects. In general then, Dialectic Materialism regards the world as a process continually changing, and inorganic nature, organic nature and human society as no more than stages in the development of matter. It seeks to establish laws which govern this development. Not the least interesting of these is the law of transformation of quantity into quality. These qualitative changes we have already seen concerning the motion of matter. It is important to note that these changes do not come about gradually but suddenly with a definite leap. This law of leaping development goes far to explain the behaviour of man as a whole. In physics it is seen in the process by which water changes to steam and steam into ice; in biology by the formation of new species by mutation; in social life by the sudden change of an old worn-out social and economic epoch into a qualitatively different one, not by evolution, but by revolution; in psychology by the sudden changes in the perception of colours and tones. The same law applies to the more complicated processes of fatigue, practice and memory. It accounts for the fact that a mere scrap of conversation or a passing remark is often sufficient to supply just the additional weight necessary to produce in a person a sharp reaction and change his behaviour entirely. It is claimed that it explains the Gestalt principle, the qualitative changes mentioned above being those configurations which by virtue of their structure determine the elements and parts

belonging to them. Space does not permit us to deal with the remaining dialectic laws.

Psychology in the light of Dialectic Materialism is defined as the science of behaviour and in this way of the *development* of the individual. It dissociates itself on the one hand from the schools that deal with psychology on the subjective side, and on the other hand from the extreme objective schools that flatly deny the existence of human consciousness. Dialectic Materialism admits thought as a process taking place within matter, though it does not definitely state that thought is a mere motion of matter. It does not consider, however, that psychical phenomena are something supernatural. They are the "other side" of physiological processes. Dialectic Materialism refuses to divide man into two parts, the body and the soul. It studies the individual as a united whole in which objective and subjective manifestations are fused organically. The individual, like all other phenomena, is not constant and immutable, but is mutable and dynamic. Hence the psychology of Dialectic Materialism studies this development. It places the greatest importance on social agencies for this development, since it regards the individual as no more than the product, and, at the same time, the sum of social relations. The synthetic view of human personality and the study of class or collective psychology, however, does not exclude an analytic treatment into the structure and mechanism of separate concrete forms of behaviour. From this analytic point of view known as "reactology" much research is being done in which individual reactions are studied and classified.

This completes our outline of the viewpoints of McDougall and Kornilov toward psychology. McDougall's theory has been criticized by scientific psychologists because of its teleological nature. Others again, while accepting the theory in the main, find it inadequate and endeavour to supplement it. It is claimed that the theory is sufficient to explain the behaviour of lower organisms, but in man other factors operate, chiefly spirit and will. The hormic theory postulates psychical causation and apparently leaves some room for autonomy and freedom of the mind. On the other hand the determining forces according to Kornilov come from outside. We see then in these two viewpoints some fundamental differences concerning the problem of determinism. Determinism steps in whenever we seek for explanations as to why individuals behave or desire in particular ways, but just what are the determining agencies concerning the activities of the individual is a matter of very diverse opinion. The psychologies already outlined in these pages have had their bearing on one or other of these viewpoints. The problem briefly resolves itself into this: Are bodily expressions (behaviour) to be accounted for in terms of subjective forces; or

are these psychical phenomena to be explained primarily on the basis of objective influences and organic conditions? Some psychologists who take the former view look further to a sub-conscious mental realm for the determining forces. This is seen in the theories held by the psycho-analysts and in such modifications of their theories as expressed by Adler and to some extent by McDougall himself. The other view, however, which looks for causation in physiological and objective conditions, is expressed in the works of the strict behaviourists and by others who do not deny the existence of mental phenomena as we have seen in the view held by Kornilov.

Let us now consider the psycho-analytic psychology with regard to the former view; and the psychology of Washburn as a representative of the latter view.

The psycho-analysts look beyond the conscious to the unconscious realm for the motives that influence behaviour. The unconscious mind cannot be introspected, but psycho-analysts do not give up looking for causes because introspection does not reveal them. They, therefore, postulate a psychic determinism, that is, they regard every event as having a psychic cause. Psycho-analysis is a late arrival in the field of psychology probably because it originated by a physician, Dr. Freud, and because it was largely developed before it attracted much notice. It is a method of getting at conflicting repressions and complexes. An important feature of this method is that of free association, and the difficulty of the analyst's task lies in the fact that the free flow of association is constantly impeded by these sub-conscious conflicts. His aim is to bring these conflicting elements from the unconscious to the conscious realm. Psycho-analysis therefore aims at releasing man from the bondage of his own ignorance, and indeed has important bearings on questions of morality. An important criticism of the method is that the analyst himself in the course of his efforts to induce the free flow of association from the subject inevitably uses the subtle influence of suggestion on the subject, a contention which Flügel seems adequately to overthrow. Further, the results of the confidential private method commonly used by psycho-analysts to get at repressions have been verified by more objective evidence, the most important of which is Jung's word association experiment.

A very interesting modification of these principles is contained in the individual psychology of Adler. His method of correcting psychical disorders is based on the following theories: Adler believes that all psychical phenomena originate from the particular creative force of the individual and are expressions of his personality. This fundamental fact of life is the striving after superiority or will to power. "Willing, thinking, talking, seeking after rest, after pleasure, learning,

understanding, work and love, betoken the essence of this eternal melody." This striving is associated with the popularly-known superiority and inferiority "complexes". An abnormal inferiority sense may arise *organically*, for example in children with defective organs or with injuries. Such children constantly deprecate themselves and behave differently from others. It may also be artificially caused, as in the case of hated or pampered children. Such conditions lead to over-compensation on the part of the individual with its consequent errors. An example of this from the social point of view is the Masculine Protest: The under-estimation of women in society caused a sense of female inferiority and this in turn led to a superiority complex as revealed in an overstrained desire in females for masculinity. Adler believes that the personality is largely fashioned by the setting up of a superiority goal in the first four or five years of life, a goal which compels the unity of the personality, since it draws with it the stream of spiritual activity. The goal thus set up is derived from a common fundamental sense of weakness, not from any comparison with others. Later in life the aim set up appears in concrete form and realizes itself in actuality. Although the same aim of superiority actuates everyone, it has endless variants and is manifested in innumerable ways, for example, in victory over men, over difficult enterprises, over social or natural limitations. It appears in one's attitude towards others, towards one's vocation, towards the opposite sex and in many other ways. In connection with these superiority goals Adler stresses the importance of a proper degree of social feeling in the individual, his attitude toward society. Failure to cultivate this accounts for our problem children, for sex perversion, crime and suicide. The first social situation with the child is the mother. If she trains the child to be interested in and to co-operate with others, a good social sense results. If she binds the child to herself alone, life's meaning for the child is that all other persons are to be excluded as much as possible. His position then is much like that of a neglected child; both are in a hostile world with a low degree of co-operation and its result in over compensation and errors. The demands of society as a living, striving, victory-seeking mass exerts an influence on the individual. Man is distinguished from the lower animals in that he must conceive his superiority goals in a *social* sense. This enforced sociability gives rise to problems requiring ability to co-operate. Our aim in healing, educating, condemning is for this purpose. Thus, only in the framework of society is the study of psychology possible at all. After the fourth or fifth year of life the style of life has been fashioned as a prototype with its particular strategy for conquering it. If the right social sense is not acquired in childhood, the individual will not have it later unless

harmful errors are recognized and corrected. Individual psychology considers the essence of therapy to lie in making the patient aware of this lack of co-operation, to convince him of the origin of this lack in early childhood maladjustments, to awaken courage and optimism by revealing the error of his revealed "inferiority complex"; in short, to give him the necessary understanding.

The psychology of Janet deals also with concrete individual cases. Janet traces individual defects to the presence of traumatic memories (trauma—a wound or injury). These memories refer to unassimilated events causing emotional disturbances to which the subject did not succeed in adapting himself, and which have resulted in neurotic conditions.

Freud's stress on sex, Adler's on will to power and Janet's on fear reveal some of the sub-conscious psychic forces that determine behaviour, especially of the abnormal type.

We have now to consider the reverse opinion as expressed by Washburn. Washburn expounds a system of motor psychology, a distinctly mechanistic system in which the laws of bodily movement are the central determining principle. She accepts the dualistic conception of mental and material processes. It is, however, not the conscious processes that affect the world of movements or the material processes causally. Consciousness is the accompaniment of certain forms of movement or motor discharge. It results not merely from ordinary adaptive movements, but from a certain ratio existing between them and their inhibition, that is, consciousness accompanies a partial but not a total checking of motor response. This inhibition is caused by what are known as incompatible movements or movements in the opposite direction to the normal line of discharge. It is a fact of experience that there is little or no conscious accompaniment when reactions are smoothly performed as in certain habitual movements, but consciousness becomes intense at an interruption. The inhibiting of movement may result from a state of unrest called a drive. A drive is often due to the lack or excess of something physiologically important, for example, in the case of hunger or fatigue. When there is a conflict between movements, victory goes to the movement connected with the stronger drive. Fear, for example, in certain cases, may be stronger than hunger. These drives lead to the explanation of emotions. An emotion may occur when the energy of a drive is prevented from finding its normal discharge in adaptive movements, that is, movements which lead to a restoration of physiological balance, and thus remains dammed up in the viscera. In this case it may discharge in non-adaptive movements or "motor explosions" such as swearing or kicking things about. Joyful emotion may occur when an excess of energy is released at the end of a period of unsatisfied drive.

Motor psychology also accounts for ideas, perception and thinking on the basis of kinæsthetic excitations. Ordinary introspection, however, does not identify them as coming from the muscles. Kinæsthetic processes ordinarily go unanalysed and unlocalized. Association of ideas is fundamentally association of movement. Ideas accompany incipient muscular contractions which form systems often represented by a symbol. Language is thus necessary for thought as it calls up the associations in the system. In perception we react to a new object as a whole, but later we begin to make specialized responses to the various parts or aspects of it. Every one of the movements involved in attending to these parts is associated with the movement of reacting to the whole object. These movements are considered to explain the "togetherness" or relational processes of Gestalt psychology. Motor psychology also offers a mechanistic explanation of purpose. An idea constitutes a purpose when this idea dominates succeeding ideas until the purpose is accomplished. The physiological basis of purpose, therefore, must be a relatively permanent state, not a fleeting movement. If then an idea is to dominate others and become a purpose, it must be associated with one of these relatively permanent states, that is, with a drive which is prevented from finding its fulfilment at once. The drive produces purposeful thought to attain its end. This purposive thinking has a physiological basis. For example, a man who cannot get relief from a drive thinks it out and becomes very quiet. This quiet is not relaxation, for thought is impossible in a state of complete muscular relaxation; it is the quiet of inner bodily tenseness. If this is relaxed the energy again causes restlessness and may be expressed in non-adaptive movements. An idea, then, may become a purpose if, being associated with a drive, it becomes associated with this persistent bodily tenseness.

In general then, we see that all aspects of mental life—emotion, perception, thought, consciousness—depend primarily on material processes and movement of some particular kind. This system of psychology resembles behaviourism in its mechanistic explanations, but differs from it in adopting a dualistic attitude.

We have now seen in brief outline two opposite views concerning the problem of determinism—the purposive and psycho-analytic psychologies on the one hand, and the mechanistic view on the other. Troland has formulated a psychophysical theory of motivation which attempts to cover all the determinative functions of mind, and thus to embrace in a comprehensive system the divergent theories of the two schools we have just considered. It is impossible in these pages to develop his comprehensive and intricate hypothesis. On the physiological side he deals with the neuro-muscular mechanism

of response as an essential consideration, and shows that the response is determined by the particular integrations or conductances in the cortex that have been established between the afferent and efferent channels. On the psychic side he supports chiefly the hedonistic doctrine of pleasantness-unpleasantness, but gives it an entirely new setting. In very general terms his hypothesis may be stated as follows: Types of behaviour that bring pleasure are "stamped in" through an increase of cortical conductances, and those that bring unpleasantness are "stamped out" through a decrease in these conductances. He proposes the term Retroflex Action to describe the process by which the stimulation of pleasurable or unpleasurable activities stamps in or out respectively their concurrent responses. During the life of the individual affection or pleasantness-unpleasantness by this process of retroflex action builds up through the medium of integrated cortical conductances certain responses and action tendencies. It follows that the choice of alternative lines of conduct by the individual in the face of a given stimulus will be determined by the *greatest past affection* in so far as this has been built up into the greatest present conductance. It is the affective history of the individual that determines the type of response. Troland's doctrine is therefore hedonistic in nature but it is a "hedonism of the past" rather than of the present or the future. Earlier hedonism stressed anticipated future or present happiness as the determinant of action. Troland's theory puts the whole burden on past affection. The instantaneous present affection is merely an index of an effect integrated in time, and the direction of anticipation is controlled by past experience. In special cases, past affection may be opposed entirely to present or anticipated events, and may therefore lead us to make unpleasant decisions for the present—an explanation which might well apply in the case of Joan of Arc. Troland uses his theory to explain the various aspects of mental life, including the process of learning, instincts, emotions, complexes and sentiments, and the structure of human personality.

This concludes our review of the outstanding psychologies of today. A general knowledge of the fundamental psychological problems here presented, even though they are only more or less vaguely comprehended by the immature student, has this advantage: It at least conveys to him a salutary warning not to rush into a narrow and dogmatic attitude because of a fairly accurate knowledge of the contents of a text-book which presents only one of the many viewpoints possible in the field of psychology. With a deeper knowledge of the various problems and theories in this field, the student may, like the eclectic, choose the best, accepting that which has shown vitality and fertility in its historical development.

THE SUBJECTIVE THEORY OF VALUE.

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LET me commence with a reference to the main representative of the Subjective Theory of Value, Professor Perry, and to his important work entitled, "The General Theory of Value". The problem to which he attempts an answer is indicated on page 4 where he says: "The theory of value must locate the seat or root of value. Is a thing valuable because it is valued? . . . Or is a thing valued because it is valuable?" "No one", he states, "would be disposed to deny that there is a common something in truth, goodness, legality, wealth, beauty and piety that distinguishes them from gravitation and chemical affinity. It is the express purpose of theory of value to discover what this something is." His task, then, is to expose the fundamental concept of value.

He tells us in the opening paragraph of Chapter 2 that what we call value is very closely linked up with our motor-affective life, "that is to say, with instinct, desire, feeling, will and all their family of states, acts, and attitudes. Because of this fact a term is needed which will refer to what is characteristic of this strain in life and mind". To meet this need he uses the term "interest". The application of the term is further explained on page 115 where he says: "It is characteristic of living mind to be *for* some things and *against* others. To be *for* or *against* is to view with favour or disfavour . . . It is to this all-pervasive characteristic of the motor-affective life . . . that we propose to give the name of 'interest'."

Having defined interest as above, Perry proceeds to maintain that interest alone is the "original source and constant feature of all value". "That which is an object of interest is *eo ipso* invested with value. Any object, whatever it be, acquires value when any interest, whatever it be, is taken in it" (page 115). He claims that Spinoza was fundamentally correct when he said that "in no case do we strive for, wish for, long for, or desire anything because we deem it to be good, but on the other hand we deem a thing to be good because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or desire it". Perry concludes that "value is thus a specific relation into which things possessing any ontological status whatever, whether real or imaginary, may enter with interested subjects" (page 116).

Perry's view, therefore, is definitely subjective. Interest alone is the source of value. Any object, any situation, any event, acquires value only when interest is taken in it. Apart from the interest, no value resides in the object, situation, or event. "The silence of the desert is without value until some wanderer finds it lonely and terrifying" (page 125).

We must now pass on to a criticism of this view of the nature of value. Though there are certain obvious and serious difficulties connected with his position, there is on the other hand much to commend it. Several of the objections that are urged against his notion of value appear to me to be either beside the point or else faulty in fact.

As a starting point for criticism and further explanation we would recall the words we have just quoted: "Value is thus a specific relation into which things possessing any ontological status whatsoever, whether real or imaginary, may enter with interested subjects". The point to be discussed first is the reference to ontological status, "whether real or imaginary". "Perry tells us", says a recent critic, "that the value of God arises from the love and admiration that the belief in Him inspires in man. Hence it makes no difference to man whether God exists or not so long as man believes in Him. If we say that our conception of value makes us indifferent to the existence of the valued object, then there is a fundamental deficiency somewhere."

Now undoubtedly this latter contention is true. If your conception of value does make you indifferent as to whether the desired object exists or not, then there is something wrong somewhere. But I do not think that Perry actually says this. It must stand to reason that the value of God lessens when doubts as to His existence enter the mind. This is a mere matter of almost everyday observation, and Perry would not deny that. What he seems to say is that so long as no such doubts enter the mind, the value remains constant. God may not exist, but if the individual is unaware of His non-existence, if no doubt as to His existence ever enters his thoughts, then the value remains. So long as a man believes firmly in the existence of God, it will make no difference even supposing God does not exist provided the individual remains in blissful ignorance of that fact. But this is not indifference to God's existence, or to put it in more general terms, to the existence of the object of his interest. A man's wife may be the object of his complete love and trust, and yet be actually unfaithful, but her acts of unfaithfulness will make no difference to his high valuation of her so long as he is ignorant of the true state of affairs.

Let us turn to Sorley's conception of the relation between value and existence. His statements are very confusing and leave one in much doubt as to what he really does mean. On

page 82 of his "Moral Values and the Idea of God", he states: "When we predicate goodness or any other value, it is always predicated upon the assumption or under the hypothesis of existence", and again, "we have already seen that all judgments of value depend upon judgments or assumptions of existence" (page 109), and lower down, "the predication of value thus implies or assumes something existing which can be said to possess the value; the true bearer of value is an existing reality or something conceived as an existing reality. Were there no existence there would be no value; value out of relation to existence has no meaning". Page 86, "In order to be good, or for that matter in order to be evil, a thing must first of all exist".

So far the meaning is clear and definite enough. Sorley holds that value always presupposes existence, and he emphasizes the point that we cannot talk rationally about value unless the bearer has existence. But he introduces other thoughts which serve to cloud the issue and are at the very least a most important modification of the quotations given above. First of all we find that "the existence need not be actual or present" (page 82), and it need only be "postulated as possible". This is already very different from saying that "were there no existence, there would be no value". But he continues, "existence need not be asserted; we do not need to believe in the actual existence of the object, but we must contemplate it as existing" (page 83), or in other words we may really believe that the object does not exist, but at all events we must pretend that it does, must think as if it were existing or could exist.

Now as compared with Perry's this seems to be a very artificial position. Perry at all events admits or implies that if a man really did not believe in the existence of God, that would make a difference to his conception of the value of God, but Sorley apparently holds that it does not matter at all whether we believe in God's existence or not so long as we postulate His existence.

Such a concept, however, may be a misleading example, and it would be better to select one not so intimately bound up with character and conduct. Is it possible for an object or a situation which never has existed or never will exist to have value for me? Can I be interested in that which for me does not exist? Sorley replies at first, "No", and then seems to say, "Yes", provided that you assume that it does exist. Perry would say, Existence is not essential for value; desire does not always refer to the existence of its object. Thus he writes: "Shall we say that all objects of desire must exist? So far as empirical evidence is concerned just the reverse is true. Shall we say that all objects of desire must be capable of existing? Utopias, chimeras, vain and quixotic desires,

constitute unanswerable evidence to the contrary" (page 76).

It seems possible to attack Perry's position from another angle. Take his example of page 613. A man is interested in a picture which he possesses because he considers that it is a Titian. He discovers, however, that it is not genuine, and his interest vanishes, or at least suffers a great diminution, and with the interest goes the value. There is a definite loss of value consequent on the loss of interest. Now it seems clear that the picture does have a very definite value for the owner while he is under the impression that it is a Titian, and if he failed to discover his mistake that value would continue. Whether the picture is a Titian or not makes no difference so long as its owner believes it to be genuine. The objection is raised that the picture never had the value, so how could it lose it? This objection seems to me to miss the point. The picture *does* have value according to Perry's definition. True if the objector means that really the picture has no monetary value, well and good, but this is using the term "value" in a very different sense.

The point where Perry's position does seem open to attack is that this view makes value dependent upon knowledge. When our knowledge of the picture is extended its value diminishes. In this way the value of an object is determined for me by my knowledge about it. Suppose I have a picture and regard it as being of no particular value. One day a friend expresses the opinion that it may be a Titian, and this judgment is later verified by an expert. The once ignored picture now takes on a new value for me. My increased knowledge has resulted in an increase of value. Can we, therefore, say that value is dependent on knowledge? The reply must be, No. First of all in some cases increase of knowledge means increase of value, and in other cases decrease of value. So at the outset we have no standard at all. Then again increase of knowledge may not lead to either increase or decrease of value. The picture is a genuine Titian! Well, what if it is? I appreciated the picture before, and now I happen to know who painted it, I can see no more beauty in it. True it is now recognized as being worth more in terms of money, but we are not speaking of value in terms of money. What really happens is that increase of knowledge leads to increase or decrease of interest and from this change in interest results the change in value. The error does not diminish the value till it weakens our interest through being found out by the interested subject himself.

According to Perry, what must exist is the value. "It is evident that the value itself in some sense exists whether the object valued does or does not exist" (page 249). From Perry's standpoint this is completely understandable. "Peace", he

says, " may possess value in time of peace when it is enjoyed, or in time of war when, in its absence, it is longed for " (page 249). From the subjective viewpoint undoubtedly we can understand that there may be value in a goal not attained, a situation not realized or an object not in actual existence. But if we say that the object is the bearer of value, how can value possibly reside in a non-existent object? In fact from this viewpoint I find it very hard to account for value in the future at all. On the realistic viewpoint how can value exist when the object valued does not exist? We must surely admit that this is actually possible. Future situations, ends, goals, have value for us long before they are attained. The value lies in the as yet non-existent situation. It does not lie in the striving alone; to say that it lies in the present anticipation of realization is only evading the point. This difficulty seems to me very much to the point in any purely objective theory of value.

Such a theory holds that value is " an indefinable quality which attaches to things independently of consciousness ". Not only is there involved the difficulty of explaining how on this view there can be value in cases where the valued object does not yet exist or has now ceased to exist, but further, the argument which Perry urges in Chapter 2 is very much to the point. This fundamental objection consists in the complete inability of most of us to experience beauty, truth and other values as qualities of objects in some way comparable to colour, extension, etc. " One who upholds this view of good ", says Perry, " must be prepared to point to a distinct *quale* which appears in that region which our value terms roughly indicate, and which is different from the object's shape and size, from the interrelation of its parts, from its relation to other objects, or to a subject; and from all the other factors which belong to the same context but are designated by words other than ' good '. The present writer finds no such residuum " (page 30).

Together with this criticism is a second which points to the fact that there are no distinctive stimuli for the values. That is to say that whereas in the case of sound we have definite vibrations from outside affecting our organs of hearing, and so on, in the case of values there is nothing to correspond to these definite stimuli. Other objective qualities demand such stimuli, follow necessarily such stimuli, but in the case of value alone, supposing it to be an objective quality attached to objects, no such stimuli evoke our response; the conclusion being that the realistic doctrine of value is insufficient.

Perry's position is assailed from another angle by Ross in his book " The Right and the Good ". He claims that Perry's subjective theory of the nature of value must rule out any possibility of intrinsic value. " It seems clear that any view which treats goodness as a relation between that which is good,

and something else, denies that anything is intrinsically good, since by calling a thing intrinsically good we mean that it would be good even if nothing else existed" ("The Right and the Good", page 75). Perry admits that "if a thing derives value from its relation to an interest taken in it, then it would seem impossible that anything should possess value in itself", and he seeks to maintain that the relational view does not involve the denial of intrinsic value, "which", says Ross, "he evidently thinks would be a consequence hostile to, if not fatal to, his view". Ross subjects Perry's defence to a close examination and comes to the conclusion that it fails to achieve its purpose. Perry attempts to get over the difficulty by means of the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. He concludes that "an object unrelated to a subject cannot be good in itself . . . but an object-desired-for-itself . . . can and does possess value in itself" (page 133). Ross insists that no amount of amendment or argument can evade the point that "non-relational attributes are intrinsic and that relational attributes cannot be made so. O-desired-by-S is not a different object which can truly be said to possess intrinsic value when it is denied that any O apart from being desired has intrinsic value. 'O-desired-by-S is good' is simply another way of saying 'any O has value not in itself but by virtue of the co-existence with it, and in a certain relation to it, of S'" ("The Right and the Good", page 77). This, according to Ross, is equivalent to denying intrinsic value to anything at all. Any relational view of value denies the existence of intrinsic value.

I think that we must admit the validity of this criticism. We cannot evade the fact that logically Perry's view of value does deny intrinsic value. Why, then, should we not admit this, and proceed to attack the whole notion of intrinsic value? This may sound revolutionary, but the suggestion is put forward in all seriousness. Take Ross's definition of intrinsic value, "by calling a thing intrinsically good, we mean that it would be good even if nothing else existed". Is it really possible to maintain this viewpoint? When we speak of a thing being good, the natural question is, Good for what? or, for whom? Apparently on Ross's view the answer must be, Good for nothing. I seriously mean that I cannot see that anything can be good except in relation to some person. If by intrinsic value you mean that an object or any bearer of value is such that it is universally desired, then well and good; but if you mean that the object is valuable whether it is desired by anyone or not, then there seems to me to be no sense at all in the notion of intrinsic value. The very word "value" implies a relation; it necessarily implies one who values and that which is valued; and to cut off the first term, thereby limiting value to the object, is to rob the meaning of value of its very essence.

Coming to another aspect of this attack on intrinsic value, let me ask, Where is it to be located? What is it that has intrinsic value? If this question is pressed home, we find that intrinsic value is very elusive. No sooner have we secured it than it seems to slip between our fingers. On Ross's view it is completely unplaceable. If we ask, Does this or that bearer of value possess intrinsic value? we are quite unable to answer. It would only have value, according to Ross, if it still had value even if nothing else existed. How can I or anyone else decide whether this or that would have value even if nothing else existed? I simply do not know and cannot give any opinion on the matter.

In his *Principia Ethica*, page 188, G. E. Moore writes as follows: "By far the most valuable things which we know or can imagine are certain states of consciousness, which may be roughly described as the pleasures of human intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful objects. No one, probably, who has asked himself the question, has ever doubted that personal affection and the appreciation of what is beautiful in Art and Nature are good in themselves; nor, if we consider strictly what things are worth having purely for their own sakes, does it appear probable that anyone will think that anything else has nearly so great a value as the things which are included under these two heads." These things then have for Moore intrinsic value. Comparing this with Ross's account we meet with much difficulty. Ross, we saw, holds that that alone has intrinsic value which would still be valuable even if nothing else existed. That is radically different from Moore. The enjoyment of beautiful objects has for him intrinsic value. If we apply Ross's criterion, could the enjoyment of beautiful objects be of value if nothing else existed? This sounds like sheer nonsense, and it is just about capable of classification as such. How can the mere enjoyment of beautiful objects or the enjoyment of the pleasures of human intercourse possibly exist alone? There must be the subject whose consciousness it is, and the beautiful objects or the other human beings, in order to have the "certain state of consciousness" at all. The two views clash and cannot be reconciled.

Let us turn back to Ross for a moment. We saw that in his opinion only that has intrinsic value which would be good even if nothing else existed. Later, in reply to the question, "What things are good?" he says that nothing has primary and underived intrinsic value except states of mind. All the complex states of mind that we think good in themselves are compounded of the three elements virtue, knowledge, and pleasure. He states that "the value of material things appears to be purely instrumental, not intrinsic" (*The Right and the Good*", page 141). Further, to speak of states of mind as alone possessing

intrinsic value "is not to say, of course, that the existence of a material universe may not be a necessary condition for the existence of many things that are good in themselves. Our knowledge and our true opinion are to a large extent about the material world, and to that extent could not exist unless it also existed" ("The Right and the Good", page 140), and so also of the other two elements. In view of this, how can we decide that these states of mind "would be good even if nothing else existed" when, according to his own admissions they, could not exist if nothing else existed? On Ross's own view it is impossible to find any place for intrinsic value. It does not exist in material things; it cannot be located in states of mind, because these have intrinsic value only if they still possess value when existing alone, which is a condition they cannot fulfil, except at the expense of their own existence.

Consider again the view of intrinsic value put forward in the following criticism: "Sorley goes too far when he tells us that instrumental not intrinsic value attaches to things . . . and certainly it seems uncontroversial that a beautiful carving as a piece of formed matter has intrinsic value . . . Any object in which I am capable of becoming absorbed may assume intrinsic value for me." So now we have another and very different opinion expressed which again cannot be reconciled with the previous authorities who were quite definite that intrinsic values are only to be found in states of mind.

Why then should we any longer hold to such a baffling conception? From whatever angle the subject of intrinsic value is approached we seem to find more difficulties. It would appear from the above quotation that an object may have intrinsic value at one time and not at another, for one person and not for another. What is there left of the notion? It seems to be only a hazy, shifting idea, appearing and disappearing, now existent, now non-existent. Let us discard the idea altogether. It is only a hindrance, a puzzle, that cannot be explained in such terms as to meet general approval.

It will, of course, be urged that this whole viewpoint is entirely relative and subjective, and emphasis will be laid on the claim that this constitutes a very serious defect. But does it? Is it not true that all value is relative? We must face the facts and not endeavour to exalt value into a position which actually it is not entitled to occupy. The truth seems to be that all value is relative, whether we like it or not. No object, situation, state of mind, real or imagined, has the same value for any two individuals. They would no longer be distinct individuals if that were the case. Part of the very essence of individuality consists in the fact that each individual sees a meaning and a value which others do not see. It is this fact that accounts for the difficulty in locating intrinsic value and

in defining value. The bearer of value will not have the same value always even for the same individual. In short, I cannot see that it is possible to secure any standard at all. The fact of interest confers value for the time being. This alone will account for the elusiveness of value and is alone a satisfactory explanation.

It seems to me quite certain that a quality of subjectiveness is inherent in all value and that any attempt to eliminate this is doomed to prove abortive. There seems to be no really essential difference between Perry's position and that of those who place all the emphasis on certain states of mind as being the highest values known. The only difference appears to be that while Perry frankly admits subjectivism the others use subjective basis and then endeavour to show that their particular viewpoint is not after all subjective. It is the subjective basis which accounts for the variable and personal nature of value. Value does not reside in anything objective but springs from the mind itself which attributes value to objects, situations and so on in order to express their relation to its acts and purposes. In all probability value is ultimately rooted in the instincts which form the background of all human activity. It cannot be confined to any particular aspect of the mental life. I do not think that we can say with Meinong that judgment plays a central part in value, or with Ehrenfels that desire is the essence of value. Value as a personal attitude is a concern of the whole man. It follows that many objects will be variously valued according to circumstances, and some will be so rarely important as to be hardly valued at all. On the other hand, an object may be constantly valued and its value come to adhere to it so that the object seems to acquire and to have value in itself. So all the varying degrees of value as well as the constancy of some values are fully accounted for from the subjective viewpoint which on the whole seems to be the most fruitful and satisfying theory of value.

THE TRAGIC VIEW.

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I.

WHAT is tragedy? and what its singular power, which makes it the concern of the philosophers, and, even for a Puritan like Milton, "the gravest, moralest, and most profitable of all other poems"?

If we go back to the first great critic, and piece out Aristotle's rather jejune official definition with the scattered indications of the *Poetics*, we reach something like this: Tragedy is the dramatic representation of a coherent, well-proportioned, credible and impressive action, in which a great and sympathetic character is brought, through some imperfection or error, to suffering and calamity (not necessarily to death¹); a representation which uses pity and fear to effect the purgation of these emotions.

Now there is perhaps some danger of taking the *Poetics* too seriously.² The book as we have it is fragmentary, nor is it easy to escape the impression that we have before us merely a set of lecture-notes or a first draft, perhaps more tentative than we realize. Aristotle seems to recognize, for instance, a possibility that tragedy may evolve into entirely new types.³ Much would be clearer if we knew how far he was theorizing, and how far methodizing accepted rules or opinions.

He devotes many pages to matters of construction and technique, literary or theatrical. But it is clear that, in his view, we have in tragedy something more than an elaborate art-form. We have a mode of ethical thought, an interpretation of life, a moral *ἐνέργεια*.⁴

What is this interpretation, and this function of *κάθαρσις*, purgation of the emotions?

¹ "All unrighteousness is sin; and there is a sin not unto death."—1 John, v, 17.

² Theorists have not always escaped the danger: witness the long tyranny of the artificial "unities" of Time and Place.

³ Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπισκοπεῶ εἰ ἄρ' ἔχει ἤδη ἡ τραγωδία τοῖς εἶδεσιν ἰκανῶς ἢ οὐ . . . ἄλλος λόγος.—*Pics.* 4.

⁴ The *ἔργον*, the product, is of course not moral instruction, nor (as Lessing thought) "virtuous habits of mind", but (I take it) a state of mind conducive in some way to moral living.

II.⁵

For the Greeks, with the statuesque poses and spare, stately movements of their tragic acting, just as for Shakespeare and their other modern descendants, with a more versatile and busy technique, tragic life is concerned with *action*: with responsible deeds, issuing from character, and leading, by an inevitable sequence that the doer can neither calculate nor control, to catastrophe and ruin. [This tragic life is not a mere "imitation" of what we call real life, with its trivialities and irrelevances. Within the frame of the situation, which may be quite artificial, even fantastic, the agents, their acts, and the sequence of events must be intelligible and "lifelike"; but they are raised and concentrated to clear and high issues.] The tragic hero is the battle-ground of spiritual forces: passions or principles, dreads, desires, scruples, incompatible loyalties—think of Orestes, who cannot avenge a murdered father save by the guilt of a mother's blood. Either in the hero's relation to other men, or (perhaps more tragically still) within his own soul, such forces as these clash in internecine strife.⁶ Again, the tragic hero is in himself an exceptional being: generally of exalted station, so that his deeds, and his sufferings, have far more than a merely personal significance; always prodigally endowed with something greatly good—not of necessity *morally* good, but something *καλὸν κάγαθόν*, some energy, courage, resoluteness, devotion or sensitiveness, that the world does not willingly let die. [We always, I think, receive an impression of sublimity, which is one ingredient in the tragic "fear".⁷]

This goodness or grandeur in the tragic hero combines with the greatness of the spiritual issues, to give an impression which, if not the centre of the tragic view, is at least very near the centre: the "impression of waste".

"'What a piece of work is man', we cry; 'so much more beautiful and so much more terrible than we knew! Why should he be so if this beauty and greatness only tortures itself and throws itself away?' We seem to have before us a type of the mystery of the whole world, the tragic fact which

⁵ Most of this section is "conveyed" or epitomized from Dr. A. C. Bradley's lectures on *Shakespearean Tragedy*. For clearness, I put strictly extraneous matter in [], or relegate it to footnotes.

⁶ Even where the "conflict" is internal, I think tragedy necessarily involves *social* relations. A tragic issue might work itself out, but I do not see how it could *arise*, within the soul of a man in isolation (Robinson Crusoe on the island, for instance).

⁷ This impression is heightened by the splendours and audacities of tragic speech, sometimes of music (as in Wagner's *Ring* or *Tristan*), often by stage-effect (notably the storm in *Lear*, the final cataclysm of *Prometheus* or *Götterdämmerung*).

extends far beyond the limits of tragedy. Everywhere, from the crushed rocks beneath our feet to the soul of man, we see power, intelligence, life and glory, which astound us and seem to call for our worship. And everywhere we see them perishing, devouring one another and destroying themselves, often with dreadful pain, as though they came into being for no other end. Tragedy is the typical form of this mystery, because that greatness of soul which it exhibits oppressed, conflicting and destroyed, is the highest existence in our view. . . . In this tragic world, then, where individuals . . . are so evidently not the ultimate power, what is this power? What account can we give of it which will correspond with the imaginative impressions we receive?”

On the one hand, “the tragic fact . . . is and remains to us something piteous, fearful and mysterious”; on the other hand, “the representation of it does not leave us crushed, rebellious or desperate. From the first [of these statements] it follows that the ultimate power in the tragic world is not adequately described as a law or order which we can see to be just or benevolent—as, in that sense, a ‘moral order’: for in that case the spectacle of suffering and waste could not seem to us so fearful and mysterious as it does. And from the second it follows that this ultimate power is not adequately described as a fate, whether malicious and cruel, or blind and indifferent to human happiness and goodness: for in that case the spectacle would leave us desperate or rebellious. . . . Such views contradict one another, and no third view can unite them; but the several aspects from whose isolation and exaggeration they spring are both present in the fact, and a view which would be true to the fact and to the whole of our imaginative experience must in some way combine these aspects.”

There can be no doubt that the idea of fatality does arise and ought to arise. “If we do not feel at times that the hero is, in some sense, a doomed man; that he and others drift struggling to destruction like helpless creatures borne on an irresistible flood towards a cataract; that, faulty as they may be, their fault is far from being the sole or sufficient cause of all they suffer; and that the power from which they cannot escape is relentless and immovable, we have failed to receive an essential part of the full tragic effect. . . . The tragic world is a world of action, and action is the translation of thought into reality. We see men and women confidently attempting it. . . . But what they achieve is not what they intend: it is terribly unlike it. . . . They fight blindly in the dark, and the power that works through them makes them the instru-

ment of a design which is not theirs. They act freely, and yet their action binds them hand and foot. And it makes no difference whether they meant well or ill. . .

"All this makes us feel the blindness and helplessness of man. . . [And] it is aided by everything which makes us feel that a man is . . . terribly unlucky. . . Men act, no doubt, in accordance with their characters; but what is it that brings them just the one problem which is fatal to them and would be easy to another, and sometimes brings it to them just when they are least fitted to face it? . . . Even character itself contributes to these feelings of fatality. How could men escape, we cry, such vehement propensities as drive Romeo, Antony, Coriolanus, to their doom? And why is it that a man's virtues help to destroy him? . . ." This tragic "fate" "appears to be a mythological expression for the whole system or order of which the individual forms an inconsiderable and feeble part; which seems to determine, far more than they, their native dispositions and their circumstances, and, through these, their action; which is so vast and complex that they can scarcely at all understand it or control its workings; and which has a nature so definite and fixed that whatever changes take place in it produce other changes inevitably and without regard to men's desires and regrets. . ."

But this "fate" cannot be viewed as "a blank necessity, totally regardless alike of human weal and of the difference between good and evil or right and wrong. . . On the contrary, . . this order shows characteristics . . . which would lead us to describe it as a moral order and its necessity as a moral necessity." We may argue thus: "Human nature is, after all, presented to us as the central fact in tragedy, and also as the main cause of the catastrophe. That necessity which so much impresses us is, after all, chiefly the necessary connection of action and consequence. For these actions we . . . hold the agents responsible; and the tragedy would disappear for us if we did not. The critical action is, in greater or less degree, wrong or bad. The catastrophe is, in the main, the return of this action on the head of the agent. It is an example of justice; and that order which . . . infallibly brings it about is therefore just. The rigour of its justice is terrible, no doubt . . . ; but, in spite of fear and pity, we acquiesce, because our sense of justice is satisfied."

"Now, if this view is to hold good, the 'justice' of which it speaks must be at once distinguished from what is called 'poetic justice,' which, "in flagrant contradiction with the facts of life," distributes prosperity and adversity in propor-

tion to the merits of the agents. Indeed, it seems to be "a mistake to use at all these terms of justice and merit or desert. . . . We might not object to the statement that Lear deserved to suffer for his folly, selfishness and tyranny; but to assert that he deserved to suffer what he did suffer is to do violence not merely to language but to any healthy moral sense. It is, moreover, to obscure the tragic fact that the consequences of action cannot be limited to that which would appear to us to follow 'justly' from [it]. . . . This is a point of view which emerges only when . . . we slip from the tragic position [and] fall back on our everyday legal and moral notions. But tragedy does not belong to the sphere of these notions; neither does the imaginative attitude in presence of it. While we are in its world we watch what is, seeing that so it happened and must have happened, feeling that it is piteous, dreadful, awful, mysterious, but neither passing sentence on the agents, nor asking whether the behaviour of the ultimate power towards them is just

"Let us [therefore] put aside the ideas of justice and merit, and speak simply of good and evil. . . . Let us understand the statement that the ultimate power is 'moral' to mean that it does not show itself indifferent to good and evil, . . . but shows itself akin to good and alien to evil. . . . The main source of the convulsion which produces suffering and death is never good: good contributes to this convulsion only from its tragic implication with its opposite in one and the same character. The main source, on the contrary, is in every case evil; and, what is more, . . . it is in almost every case evil in the fullest sense—not mere imperfection, but plain moral evil. . . . And the inference is obvious. . . . The ultimate power which shows itself disturbed by this evil and reacts against it must have a nature alien to it. Indeed its reaction is so vehement and 'relentless' that it would seem to be bent on nothing short of good in perfection, and to be ruthless in its demand for it."

Moreover, "evil exhibits itself everywhere as something negative, barren, weakening, destructive, a principle of death. . . . That which keeps the evil man prosperous, makes him succeed, even permits him to exist, is the good in him. . . . When the evil in him masters the good and has its way, it destroys other people through him, but it also destroys *him*. . . . And the inference would seem clear. If existence in an order depends on good, and if the presence of evil is hostile to such existence, the inner being or soul of this order must be of one nature with good."

These aspects of the tragic world suggest "an order which does not indeed award 'poetic justice', but which reacts through the necessity of its own 'moral' nature both against attacks made upon it and against failure to conform to it". But this idea still "does not include the whole of the facts. . . . The evil against which [this moral order] asserts itself, and the persons whom this evil inhabits, are not really something outside the order, so that they can attack it or fail to conform to it. . . . We feel that they are *its* parts, expressions, products; that in their defect or evil *it* is untrue to its soul of goodness, and falls into conflict and collision with itself; that in making them suffer and waste themselves, *it* suffers and wastes itself; and that when, to save its life and regain peace from this intestinal struggle, it casts them out, it has lost a part of its own substance—a part more dangerous and unquiet, but far more valuable and nearer to its heart, than that which remains. . . . There is no tragedy in its expulsion of evil: the tragedy is that this involves the waste of good.

"Thus we are left at last with an idea showing two sides or aspects which we can neither separate nor reconcile. The whole or order against which the individual part shows itself powerless seems to be animated by a passion for perfection: we cannot otherwise explain its behaviour towards evil. Yet it appears to engender this evil within itself, and in its effort to overcome and expel it it is agonized with pain, and driven to mutilate its own substance and to lose not only evil but priceless good. That this idea . . . is no solution of the riddle of life is obvious; but why should we expect it to be such a solution? . . . Tragedy would not be tragedy if it were not a painful mystery." Nor does every writer of tragedy even point distinctly in any direction where a solution might lie. Yet "sometimes from the very furnace of affliction a conviction seems borne to us that somehow, if we could see it, this agony counts as nothing against the heroism and love which appear in it and thrill our hearts. Sometimes we are driven to cry out that these mighty or heavenly spirits who perish are too great for the little space in which they move, and that they vanish not into nothingness but into freedom. Sometimes from these sources and from others comes a presentiment . . . that all the fury of conflict, with its waste and woe, is less than half the truth, even an illusion. . . . But these faint and scattered intimations that the tragic world, being but a fragment of a whole beyond our vision, must needs be a contradiction and no ultimate truth, avail nothing to interpret the mystery. We remain confronted with the inexplicable fact, or the no less inexplicable appearance, of a world travailing

for perfection, but bringing to birth, together with glorious good, an evil which it is able to overcome only by self-torture and self-waste. And this fact or appearance is tragedy."

III.

I have quoted copiously—perhaps too copiously—from Dr. Bradley, because (unless I am still, after twenty-eight years, deluded by the spell of his eloquent voice and his high seriousness) he expresses singularly valuable ideas in a most vivid and cogent way. And what he says of Shakespeare seems to hold good, with remarkably little qualification, of the Greeks. Qualification there must be, of course. In particular, the idea of fatality (with a theological colouring, certainly) is far more prominent: we have nothing in Shakespeare to compare, say, with the horror that broods over the fated house of Atreus, nor with the irony that brings *Œdipus* to his tragic sin through his very efforts to frustrate the oracle that predicts it. Nor have we the retributive justice that

Commends the ingredients of our poison'd chalice
To our own lips,

and tempers its proportions with a somewhat casuistical precision.

Dr. Bradley's view is strongly tinctured with Hegelian thought, but is not Hegel's. For Hegel, the essence of tragedy is a collision between universal ethical forces, each in itself justifiable; the *dénouement* is, of necessity, a "reconciliation" in which the eternal justice composes its conflict with itself and returns out of division and strife into the eternal repose of its own substance. Thus the tragic conflict appeals not "simply to our sensibilities or our instinct or self-preservation, but also to our deeper mind or spirit (*Geist*)", because "it is itself a conflict of the spirit. It is a conflict, that is to say, between powers that rule the world of man's will and action—his 'ethical substance'. . . The essentially tragic fact is the self-division and intestinal warfare of the ethical substance, not so much the war of good with evil as the war of good with good. Two of these isolated powers face each other, making incompatible demands. The family claims what the state refuses, love requires what honour forbids. The competing forces are both in themselves rightful; . . . but the right of each is pushed into a wrong because it ignores the right of the other, and demands that absolute sway which belongs to neither alone, but to the whole of which each is but a part. . .

"The end of the tragic conflict is the denial of both the exclusive claims. It is the act of the ethical substance itself, asserting its absoluteness against the excessive pretensions of its particular powers." Sometimes the spiritual unity can end the conflict peacefully, by reconciling the claims of the contending powers—so, for instance, the forensic adjustment of the claims of father-right and mother-right in the *Eumenides*. "Sometimes the hero by his own self-condemnation and inward purification reconciles himself with the supreme justice, and is accepted by it." So the *Œdipus* of Sophocles or the *Faust* of Goethe. Even where the quarrel is pressed to extremes, and involves catastrophe and death, Hegel sees a "reconciliation", in that the ethical forces are finally affirmed—but is this really a reconciliation? The smile seems to be on the face of the tiger.

Now, no doubt it is unfair to discuss Hegel's view of Tragedy in isolation from its metaphysical context and implications; and no doubt his thought was less arbitrary and cold than it appears in the mere lecture-notes of the *Aesthetik*. But beneath the searching dialectic and the brilliant illustration and criticism, is there not (I speak as a fool) a good deal of arbitrary, "formal" symmetry and mere *raisonnement*? The "war of good with good" is indeed a poignant tragic theme, and an element in many a tragic nexus; but can we at all generally, even in Greek tragedy,^a find it "embodied in the contending characters", or make it the centre of the play, without distorting our imaginative experience? The metaphysician may be justified in ignoring the moral quality of tragic action, and the aspect of evil, or in taking little notice of the aspect of suffering and the way suffering is endured; but with these things he ignores much of the intensity and nobility of tragic life.

It is these very aspects, of course, that appeal to the pessimists. For Schopenhauer, with his quick sympathy and his hatred of injustice and cruelty, life is "a mistake" or "*une mauvaise plaisanterie*"; and naturally "the representation of a great misfortune is the sole essential of tragedy". "The tragic art brings us face to face with the terrible facts of existence, the unspeakable suffering, the triumph of evil, the tyranny of chance, the pitiable destruction of the guiltless. We see the heroes of tragedy, the highest and noblest of human creatures, after long conflict and unhappiness abandon the unequal struggle, renounce their vain and wilful ambitions, at last

^a His view is ultimately a theory of *Æschylean* and *Sophoclean* tragedy, not even of Greek tragedy as a whole. Modern tragedy is admitted only by a compromise.

freely and joyfully surrender their once-cherished lives. And we, the spectators of that conflict and that surrender, are by them equally persuaded of life's vanity, and ourselves are moved to a similar disengagement of the will to live, to like renunciation and like resignation."

Schopenhauer admits, indeed, with naïve candour, that the Greek tragic heroes submit to inevitable fate, but die unresigned, defiant, or comforted by the thought of revenge.

Nietzsche repudiates the moral evaluation of life, and sees in individuation the primary cause of evil. Tragedy, for him, is the fusion of two arts: music, "the Dionysian mirror of the world" of hopeless and unspeakable sadness; and the plastic art of Apollo, a shining picture of consoling illusion. To the chorus, the Dionysian dithyramb, a music of ineffable sadness, Apollo brought the Olympian radiance of clear-cut individual forms, images of healing and immortal beauty. So Tragedy was born. Our instinctive and final sympathy is with the Dionysian wisdom, the bliss of collapse that frees us from personality. "We see before us, in epic clearness and beauty, the tragic hero, a figure sorrowful but divine, yet we delight in his annihilation." So tragedy becomes an anodyne of illusion, that enables us to endure the horror of an existence rooted in pain.

IV.

Now, in the "experience" that leads either to Hegel's "reconciliation" or to Schopenhauer's resignation, or to Bradley's antinomy, the Aristotelian *κάθαρσις* is obviously implicit. But what really is this *κάθαρσις*? The expression is grammatically ambiguous: the object of the verb, or the objective genitive with the *nomen actionis*, may be either the *patient* who is purged by medical treatment or ritual purification,⁹ or the "*perilous stuff*" that is purged away. Does Aristotle mean, then, that when we live for an hour in the intense and exalted life of tragedy, our emotions are purified from their morbid and selfish elements? That fear for ourselves is changed into (shall we call it) the fear of God, and a pity which is but the other side of fear, a pity for men of like passions with ourselves, made victims of a fate that might be ours, changed into a tenderness for

the burthen of the mystery
of all this unintelligible world?

⁹ The metaphor here is probably medical. But it makes no great difference, since ritual purification was a recognized treatment for disease, especially for mental disorders. Plato, moreover, uses *κάθαρσις* for the riddance of false opinions.

(This seems to be the prevailing view of his English critics.) Or does he rather mean that "tragedy is a vent for the particular emotions of pity and fear"—a kind of homœopathic treatment of what he regards as a species of pain? On this view, "pity and fear, artificially stirred, expel the latent pity and fear which we bring with us from real life. . . In the pleasurable calm which follows when the passion is spent, an emotional cure has been wrought."¹⁰ And in this calm we can see life steadily and see it whole.

Both interpretations are coherent and valuable. The first, I think, is more consonant with Bradley's general view, the second with Hegel's¹¹ and with Schopenhauer's. But the second seems to me to come nearer to Aristotle's intention. The clue is probably to be found in a passage of the *Politics* (v/viii.7.1342), where he compares "pity and fear" with morbid religious ecstasy, which is cured by the excitement of wild music: "precisely the same thing necessarily occurs with those who are subject to pity and fear, and with emotional people generally. . . They experience a *κάθαρσις* and a pleasurable sense of relief."¹²

This, indeed, is still too allusive to be decisive. The answer may depend on a wider question: can we regard this *κάθαρσις* as the *purpose* of tragedy, either in historical times or at least in its origins? In other words, was Greek tragedy not merely an act of worship or an adjunct to ritual, but specifically the development of a cathartic ritual? Unfortunately, the early history of tragedy is dark. Aristotle tantalizingly dismisses it as "well-known". The extant traditions meagre at best, hardly go beyond matters of literary and theatrical technique. We are left with nothing more than interesting possibilities.

First, why is tragedy associated with Dionysos? or who is Dionysos that tragedy should be associated with his worship? The popular theory of the moment makes a god a

¹⁰ Butcher: *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, p. 246. I omit a hedging clause.

¹¹ He leaves tragic "sensibility" to "your country cousin"; indeed, emotion can find a place in his metaphysic only as "implicit" or "unrealized" reason.

¹² ὁ γὰρ περὶ ἐνίας συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχὰς ἰσχυρῶς, τοῦτο ἐν πάσαις ὑπάρχει, τῷ δὲ ἥττον διαφέρει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον, οἷον ἔλεος καὶ φόβος, ἔτι δ' ἐνθουσιασμός. καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως κατακώχιοι τινες εἰσὶν ἐκ τῶν δ' ἱερῶν μελῶν ὀρώμεν τούτους, ὅταν χρῆσονται τοῖς ἐξοργιάζουσιν τὴν ψυχὴν μέλει καθισταμένων ὥσπερ ἰατρίας τυχόντας. ταῦτο δὲ τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον πάσχειν καὶ τοὺς ἐλεήμονας καὶ τοὺς φοβητικούς καὶ τοὺς ὅλως παθητικούς, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει τῶν τοιούτων ἐκάστω, καὶ πᾶσι γίγνεσθαι τινα κάθαρσιν καὶ κουφίζεσθαι μεθ' ἡδονῆς.

"projection" from a ritual, or from the collective emotion of the participants—thus our Father Christmas is the "projection" of our Christmas customs. Dionysos, as god of the vine, would then be a "projection" from the vintage-ritual and vintage-revel—a sort of personified ecstasy, that develops into a kindly god of joy and freedom. His orgiastic ritual, his foreign origin, and the romantic stories that gathered round his name, made the cult popular. But he was far more than a "departmental" god of wine; and in the Orphic mysteries the twice-born Dionysos, the ever-dying and reliving, became the centre of a spiritual religion: a mystical gnosis of justice and retribution, of a new birth and union with the godhead, of the hope of immortality; and a discipline of ascetic purity and gentle, lofty morality.

At Athens, tragedy was firmly associated with Dionysos. It was a part of the solemn splendour of his great six-day festival in late March. His altar was the centre of the orchestra; the best seat in the theatre belonged to his priest. Yet the themes of the extant plays, and the surviving titles of others, are only by exception Dionysiac. Was this an innovation, and does the obscure proverb *Οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν Διόνυσον*—"Nothing to do with Dionysos"—represent a conservative protest? It is quite possible, but we have no definite evidence.¹³ Can the tragic interpretation of life be a reflection of Dionysian theology? This again seems possible. Or was the connexion with Dionysos merely fortuitous?—was it by pure chance that Thespis brought his waggon-stage and his wine-painted chorus to Athens just at the time of the Great Dionysia? Or did the fashionable god seize to himself what had belonged to others?

The late Sir William Ridgeway,¹⁴ emphasizing the frequent appearance of a tomb, a tomb-ritual, or a ghost on the tragic stage, held that tragedy sprang from the cults of local heroes, celebrated (he assumes) by the representation of their life and death. Dionysos would then have taken possession of these cults, with their tragic themes, just as Zeus,

¹³ The transition might be easier if we could, with Aristotle, derive tragedy from the Dithyramb, the "orgiastic and passionate" revel-song that was primarily and continuously regarded as Dionysiac. The surviving specimens are lyrics, based on narrative themes treated very allusively—and again the themes are as a rule non-Dionysiac. It is interesting that speeches in the first person are frequent, and that one specimen is in dialogue form. But there seem to be serious difficulties in the proposed affiliation. (The Dithyramb, for one thing, was sung and danced by a "circular" chorus of 50, while the tragic chorus was much smaller, and its formation "tetragonal".)

Professor Gilbert Murray surmises that every tragedy represents the supposed *αἴτιον*—the mythological basis—of some rite in vogue in the worship of Dionysos.

¹⁴ *The Origin of Tragedy*.

Apollo, Artemis and the other Olympians arrogated to themselves the rituals, attributes, and cult-names of a host of local worships. Such a view would very happily explain the predominance of non-Dionysiac themes. But it fails for lack of evidence.¹⁵

Miss Jane Harrison goes one better, and derives both the hero-cults and Dionysos himself from the primitive and probably universal conception of a "Year-Daimon"¹⁶ or "vegetation-spirit"—the vaguely personal and vaguely divine embodiment of the cycle of growth and decay, death and rebirth in nature. This conception takes us back to an age when religion was not yet a matter of theology or morality, but of magic—the "sympathetic" or imitative magic that brings rain by pouring water on a stone, or wind by whistling, makes you invisible if you close your eyes, or gives you the *mana* of an animal if you eat its flesh or wear its skin. So, to ensure the Spring *renouveau* of man and beast and plant after the Winter-death, you must enact it. The seasonal change is a death and rebirth of the god—Adonis, Osiris, Dionysos or another; and his divine priest-king, or a human or animal surrogate—for the primitive mind only dimly distinguishes man from beast, or the inchoate god from his magician-priest—must die and rise again in a new life. Often the torn and dismembered victim is devoured, or buried in the fields, as a fertility-charm.

With more rational ways of thought, the ritual is reinterpreted: no longer as controlling the process of nature, but as helping and strengthening the god in his mighty task; then, later, as a reverent imitation of his work—an act of sacramental worship. A mimic death and rebirth replace the grim reality, and the old magic becomes a *dramatic* ritual. In various regions, including Thrace whence Dionysos came, and even Thessaly within the borders of Hellas, we find a crude passion-play of this type, in which Miss Harrison, Sir Wm. Ridgeway and others see the germ of Tragedy. In many of the Greek tragedies, indeed, Professor Murray¹⁷ claims to have identified the "ritual forms" of such a Spring-*δρόμενον*: a Conflict between the Old and New Year (or their equivalents); a Ritual Death and often mutilation of the Year-Daimon; a Lamentation; a Resurrection, or a Theophany of the new power—these are the principal points. The analysis

¹⁵ Herodotus gives *one* instance (at Sicyon) of the transference of *τραγικοί χοροί*—whatever the expression means—from a hero to Dionysos. But this was "the arbitrary act of a tyrant, done with a special political motive", not a normal religious development.

¹⁶ *Themis*, Ch. VIII.

¹⁷ In a contribution to Miss Harrison's *Themis*.

is ingenious and suggestive; but in most plays it has to admit too many gaps and dislocations in the ritual sequence to be convincing: we should have to suppose that the essential acts of the old ritual survived as mere dramatic conventions or *scènes à faire*.

But anthropology offers another conception that may have a more direct significance: the preparation for Spring by a practical and ceremonial purification, a great personal, domestic and communal spring-cleaning, physical and moral. The argument is obvious: the magic will fail, or the god be angry, if they are approached in guilt or impurity. The houses and household plenishment are cleansed or renewed, the people purified by bathing, purging, and abstinence, the dreadful ghosts placated and sent away. The sins of the people are laid upon a *φαρμακός*, a scapegoat. He becomes *ταρι*, *sacer*, ἅγιος, at once holy and accursed; and he is slain or driven out with his load of sin. It is an act of justice, an execution, not a sacrifice. In the more advanced communities, the *φαρμακός* is often a condemned criminal (so at Athens, for example); and generally he has for a time enjoyed the splendour and honour and power of a king or a god; then he is struck down in the midst of the pomp, or stripped and abused.

Here we have clear tragic motives: the fall from high estate, the idea of guilt and expiation, the suffering that far transcends personal desert, the impending doom; and a *κάθαρσις*, a purifying of the community. And we may have a clue to some of the tragic stories: Iphigenia is a literal *φαρμακός*; and the same idea would illuminate the situation of the guiltless Antigone, of Ædipus and Prometheus.

The exorcism of the ghosts, again, appears at Athens in the February feast of the Anthesteria. This cannot have been, at that season, the "feast of flowers" that the name suggests; nor, probably, was it at first a Dionysiac festivity, but a solemn and anxious festival of All Souls. The ghosts, the *κῆρες*, were released from their coffin-jars, sojourned till the third day among the living, who (a curious detail) protected themselves by chewing the purgative buckthorn; then, feasted and placated with ritual offerings, they were sent back to their underworld. But these *κῆρες* develop into more than ghosts. They appear as harpies, gorgons, furies, fates; as noisome

¹⁸ πολλῶν δὲ ὄντων καὶ καλῶν ἐν τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίῳ, τοῖς πλείστοις αὐτῶν οἷον κῆρες ἐπιπεφύκασιν, αἱ καταμαίνουσιν τε καὶ καταρρυπαίνουσιν αὐτά. —*Laws* XI, 937 D. (The specific application is to the corruption of Justice by the arts of the advocate.)

sprites that cause blindness and madness, disease and death; once at least, as moral defects, when Plato says: "there are many fair things in the life of mortal men; but to most of them cling parasite κήρες that befoul and disfigure them."¹⁸

The anthropologists have given us an imposing array of extraordinarily interesting facts. How far their interpretations and deductions are justified—in other words, how far the record of primitive life and thought is complete—is perhaps an open question. Still, it seems as certain as anything of the kind can be, that the cult of Dionysos sprang from such conceptions and such rituals as I have spoken of. Tragedy may well have been born of the union of the choric hymn with these ritual conceptions—rationalized, moralized, and spiritualized in the religious reformation when the radiant Olympians superseded the old dark gods, so that the ancient magic, that had purged the tribe of broken taboos and malicious ghosts, became a discipline to purge the mind of the ghosts of false opinion and the gorgons and harpies and furies of passion that "befoul and disfigure" our philosophic faith.

"Through pity and fear"—which means (though it does not merely mean) through sympathy and awe. There is a strange mystical satisfaction in the contemplation, or rather in the acceptance, of suffering. Most of us, in bereavement, unhappy love, painful or incurable disease, have felt ourselves exalted, set apart, clairvoyant; many of us, who have been a part of great events, have known "unimagined interpretations, divinations almost, of the true nature and scale of things". Suffering, and great events, expressed in living images of beauty; this is Tragedy. And it bears us, through sensuous delight, to a region beyond sense, through emotion, to a summit above emotion, where we see, dimly and transiently, yet see, knowing not what we see, something of Reality, the Absolute, the Infinite, or whatever name our metaphysic invokes.

SOME REFLECTIONS ON SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

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AROUND the great psychic forces on which depend the preservation of the individual and the race and the elevation of social life there have been fashioned systems or institutions that, within wider or narrower limits, determine the initiative of individuals. If we reflect for a moment on the institutions of social life involved in buying a loaf of bread, in bringing a suit at law, in marrying, or in religious worship, we can easily see the prepotent part these systems play in the lives of the members of any community. Yet most people today do not reflect on the framework of society in which they live, move and have their being. The vast majority live on the level of custom and never think of the various ways in which their lives are aided or hindered, their personalities extended or contracted, by social institutions. Individuals come and go, but the institutions live on fundamentally unchanged until the stresses that have developed bring down the structure about the ears that hear not and the eyes that see not.

In regard to all our institutions we must realize that function is the end ; after all, the structure is but the means to that end. Every institution has been evolved to deal with some human problem. It may solve the problem or fail to do so ; it may cease to exist when the problem is solved or it may continue to live parasitically on the social body. But social institutions do not owe their existence to the efforts of all members of a community. Commonly, those who adopt a new method of dealing with social problems have to face the opposition of the herd. "To succeed in the hour", says Cooley, "one must be the man of the hour, and must ordinarily harness his very soul to some sort of temporary activity which may after all be of no real worth. An upper class is institutional in its very essence, since it is control of institutions that makes it an upper class and men can hardly keep this control except as they put their hearts into it. Successful business men, lawyers, politicians, clergymen, editors and the like, are such by identifying their minds, for better or worse, with the present activities and ideals of commercial and other institutions. Seldom does the new conscience when it seeks a new teacher to declare to men what is wrong, find him in the dignitaries of the church, the state,

the culture that is. The higher the rank the closer the tie that binds those to what is but ought not to be." We therefore find that many of our institutions, instead of producing desirable social effects, benefit the members of the institution at the expense of the rest of the community. Normally, this evil result does not follow immediately on the foundation of the institution, but vested interests soon grow up and in course of time defeat the good of the community. In other cases, despite the best endeavours of reformers, institutions outlive their usefulness and in the changed conditions of the people produce injurious results or retard progress. This may more easily happen if the mass of the people are ignorant; for the benefits accruing, though trivial, may be showy while the evil effects may be concealed and insidious. Chattel slavery and the subjection of women seem to be clear cases of the latter perversion. Institutions, too, tend to gather property and prestige and thus may come to exercise an influence out of all proportion to the value of the ends they serve. Unfortunately, as most people do not reflect on the nature and purposes of their institutions, they come to look upon them as necessarily good, and resent any attempt to modify them radically as an attack on law and order, as an attempt to undermine the very basis of good government. In the light of present knowledge and under modern conditions this attitude should be no longer possible. Cannot we cultivate something of the spirit of the great Spinoza, who over two hundred years ago left us these pregnant words: "When I have applied my mind to politics so that I might examine what belongs to politics with the same freedom of mind as we use in mathematics, I have taken my best pains not to laugh at the actions of mankind, nor to groan over them, but to understand them."

All human institutions must be judged not by their respectable ancestry but by the effects they actually produce in the life of the people of the day. In these circumstances it seems clear that unless a community is prepared to suffer the inevitable consequences it can afford neither to treat its institutions with contempt nor to fall down and worship them. The latter tendency is by far the more common and probably the more disastrous socially. We must therefore have courage to look below the surface because in the case of many institutions beneath the display of social service lie hidden the rottenness of parasitism and personal aggrandisement. By a brief reference to some of our institutions I shall try to justify this criticism.

PARLIAMENT.

In a democratic community the main purpose of parliament is to act as a means by which the sovereign people expresses

its will. But today no one would think of devising the present system based on party government as a method of attaining this end. For under present conditions the great mass of the people has no part to play in the vital things of government which are in the hands of the Prime Minister and Cabinet in the House and in those of the party managers in the electorates. The whole of our parliamentary institutions bear witness to their source, conflict, that finds expression in the bicameral and party systems. Each new class as it came to self-consciousness desired to take part in the control of the lives of its members. It tried to make itself articulate in parliament but found that under the system in vogue it could do so only by combination or by compromise with other established parties. The idea that underlies this system is that which we find in law : that truth emerges through the conflict of parties. If there be two parties with different programmes, that which wins is the more worthy. But dead causes, like dead men, tell no tales and undoubtedly the principal tendency of the present method is to lead men to give up the difficult task of seeking the solution of our social problems and to follow the line of least resistance by joining themselves to the big battalions that will forward their interests. This feeling is strengthened by man's gregarious instinct, by his self-feeling, by his tribal history and by his desire for plunder. These evils are greatly increased when there are more than two parties, for then it frequently happens that a party that holds the balance of power exercises authority without responsibility. The story is told of one member of the English Parliament, who, when the question of women's suffrage came before the House and the party whips went out of action for the time being, said, "This is the first time in parliamentary life that any one of us is free to use his own judgment ; no wonder we are embarrassed, the faculty of free judgment has atrophied." As Graham Wallas has so clearly shown, parliament has failed both as an organization of thought and as an organization of will. It knows neither what to do nor how to get things done. This result is not surprising if we remember that a system that gives an elector a vote but restricts his choice to a small number of candidates selected by the party leaders, a system that practically precludes the possibility of men standing as candidates unless they are prepared not only to attach themselves to one of the parties of the day but also to subordinate their judgment on matters of vital moment to that of a party whose efforts may be directed not to the welfare of the community but to the preservation of office and its emoluments for some members of the party, seems almost cunningly designed to prevent any real direction of public policy by the people. Further, the system of party government within the House is a most effective method of preventing members from giving a free

expression of opinion and a free vote on matters of public import. It is not by mere accident that those who control members of Parliament are called "whips". So far have these pernicious influences penetrated into our public life that so-called democratic states have, on the one hand, compelled electors to enrol and vote and, on the other, have accepted as a fundamental axiom of public life that a real independent can play no effective part in their political systems.

Surely the time is long overdue for an intelligent remodelling of our parliamentary system. It has been said that one of the most important functions of politicians is to baptize with popular or indifferent words things the people cannot tolerate under the old names. This tendency can be counteracted only by vigilance, knowledge and courage on the part of the people. The government is truly democratic when the people realize that the bed they lie in is the bed they have made. The hopeful sign today is that many more people are beginning to have an uneasy feeling that their beds, and very uncomfortable ones at that, are being made for them.

THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM.

No one will deny that the purpose of any social system of production, industry and commerce is the satisfaction of all the reasonable wants of the members of the community as the basis of the development of higher personalities. Can anyone deny that the present system most effectually defeats that end? No one who sees the Himalayas of wealth at one end of the social scale and the Saharas of poverty at the other end, no one who realizes that under the present system a certain amount of unemployment, more or less according to circumstances, is inevitable, no one who has been struck by the fact that it is only in times of war when the present system of industry is temporarily suspended that unemployment ceases and men and women become not a liability but an asset, no one who is cognizant of the fact that a necessary feature of the present system of organization is the limitation of output or the destruction of large quantities of the goods produced, no one who has had a glimpse of the truth that the great discoveries that might have raised the general level of social life have been diverted to ends that are in great part anti-social—no one who impartially reviews the facts can doubt that as an institution for providing for the needs of all the people our economic system, despite the praises of those economists who love to describe themselves as "orthodox", is a miserable failure. I do not believe that any unprejudiced man can rise from a study of such works as Chase's "Tragedy of Waste", Tawney's "Acquisitive Society" and Soddy's Essays in any doubt that we have failed to organize

this aspect of our social life in the public interest. So much is this the case that sensitive souls fear discoveries that can facilitate so-called industrial progress only at the cost of unemployment, misery and even starvation of hundreds of our fellow creatures. Hear the tragic words of a great investigator : "Discoveries and inventions indeed today have their terrors as well as their satisfactions. To be the first to hold in one's hand a specimen of synthetic alizarin or indigo, the manufacture of which hitherto had been the secret of life, and yet to be educated enough to see in the test-tube not merely the alizarin but a vision of the shortly-to-be-ruined madder planters of France—not merely the indigo but a swarming oppulation of India deprived of their traditional livelihood—as soon as they start 'to make these things by machinery' is an experience which, if bitter, is denied to the creator in the realms of sculpture or painting or of those who clothe in immortal words our common thought."

One cause of this evil tendency is to be found in the history of the development of industry. There was a time when the dominant force in the community was the land owner. Whatever may be said in criticism of the old landed aristocracy they at least were in contact with the facts and knew something of the lives of those by whose labours they prospered. But the manufacturers defeated the landowners and the power passed in a large measure to men who, especially after the rise of the Joint Stock Coy., envisaged industry only through dividends. With the development of the modern credit systems power has passed to those who deal in paper which bears on its face nothing of the realities of life : the sweat, happiness and misery of the actual producer. In dealing with this subject Hobson writes : "Probably the heaviest human cost, however, is a certain moral callousness or recklessness involved in the financial struggle. For the paper symbols of industrial power which financiers handle are so abstract in nature and so remote from the human facts which they direct that the chain of causation linking stocks and shares with human work and human life is seldom raised." Surely the social purpose of a financial system should be to organize the capital and credit of a people and to ration it to those tasks whereby the welfare of the community will be increased. In comparison with this the present system is a grim jest. It is well known that capital and credit, which are mainly social products, flow to those works that show the biggest returns, irrespective of the weal or woe of the people. Whether capital shall flow to the production of slums or of town planning, to the cultivation of our lands or to the illegal importation of drugs depends in the long run not on the social end to be attained but on the dividend to be received. Capital is a respecter neither of persons nor of purposes. The anti-social

tendencies of the financial system can be clearly seen in the watering of stock in all its manifold forms whereby at the expense of the outsider and the community a gift is made to those who have inside knowledge. Too frequently wealth is not a sign of intelligence and hard work but of opportunity combined with a measure of moral callousness.

EDUCATION.

Among educationists at least there would be agreement that the aim of education is to liberate men's minds, involving an increase in knowledge, a widening of human sympathies and a development in self-control and courage. If this be accepted as the aim of education then I have no doubt that the spirit of our educational system is against this end. The treatment of those who have endeavoured to develop this spirit in education bears witness to the truth of this statement. Progress in natural science and in religious freedom is marked by martyrdom. Many people imagine that freedom of thought has been won for us by our ancestors. But freedom cannot be handed to a people; it must ever be won anew. If in the fields of natural science and religion there appears to be freedom of thought it is because the centre of interest has shifted. Men have become interested in other problems and here authority will not permit freedom of thought if it can possibly help it. Indeed, until in every sphere we are prepared to adopt progress as our motto and be anxious to adjust the system to the varying needs of man and the changes in his environment we must fight for freedom. Today the centre of interest is to be found in the problems of economic and social relations. Today the spirit of suppression of thought moves in this field just as it did in the Middle Ages in the fields of religion and natural science. Our educational system manifests this spirit. A conservative leader unveiling a memorial to Mrs. Pankhurst is not necessarily a sign of greater freedom in social thought. It may be merely hauling down the flag of suppression on one small ship that has become obsolete. Think of some of the terrible suppressions of thought in the war period, suppression of those who, it is now admitted, were trying to unmask the lies of some of our leaders. Are we not foolish if we imagine that in the sphere of the social sciences the battle for freedom of thought is won? It has hardly begun. Our schools have yet to be liberated. The aim of education is not to teach children to believe a certain set of doctrines. Its aim should be to develop initiative, the spirit of inquiry, the willingness to follow the truth whithersoever it may lead. Can anyone affirm that our educational system is dominated by this spirit? Who can deny the words of Bertrand Russell? "Education is, as a rule, the strongest force on the

side of what exists and against fundamental change ; threatened institutions, while they are still powerful, possess themselves of the educational machine and instil a respect for their own excellence into the malleable minds of the young. Reformers retort by trying to oust their opponents from their position of vantage. The children themselves are not considered by either party ; they are merely so much material to be recruited into one army or the other."

If you desire a demonstration of the truth of this statement I invite you to visit a good kindergarten or infant department and note the spirit of enthusiasm, inquiry, perseverance and freedom. Then come up through the standards of the primary schools, up through the secondary schools and university colleges and see this spirit being repressed and dying out. No one can apply this simple test and fail to realize how the system is defeating the real aim of education.

If these things are so in the schools, what must be said about those other educational agencies—the Church and the Press? How far is the Church concerned today with the liberation of men's souls for the entrance of new truth? How far is it an organization to shackle human freedom with the chains of the superstitions and ignorance of a primitive people? Of the Press little need be said. It is doubtful whether in any real sense the modern Press is educative. The Press has been commercialized. It has ceased to be directed by the spirit of education and is directed by that of business and propaganda. Here the editor no longer sits on the throne ; the seat of power is occupied by the business manager.

Such institutions are part of the framework of modern society ; unless we are prepared to examine them impartially and to remodel them to meet the needs and aspirations of the people we may find the whole structure toppling about our ears.

FROM GAY TO GRAVE.

By RICHARD LAWSON, Litt.D.,

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I NOTICE that this magazine, according to the legend on the front cover, is officially devoted to philosophy and psychology. The back cover adds social science, and finally at the end of a list including psycho-analysis, mental tests and sociology, tags on education, somewhat as we used to tag a heavy piece of rag or paper on to a kite's tail. I say "we" because it is probable that other dry-as-dusts were once boys and made kites. The tail of the kite is not attached till all the cross-wise pieces of paper have been tied on; even so, apparently there can't be education till there is something to hang on and something to hang on to. This dependence, apparently so mortifying for the science and art, represented by Education (with a majuscule) confers a true freedom. It is most liberative and exhilarative to escape from the stern requirements of the *-ologies* and the *-orophies* into a free and easy *-ation*. That Education has this free-and-easy characteristic—vague patter its critics call it—may be seen from the attempts to define it. It seems as illusive as the unknowable—perhaps it *is* the unknowable. At all events, its asserted boundaries are as wide apart as is the Ptolemaic universe from the Einsteinian. Thus, an ancient sage—and therefore reverend because ancient—one Menander, declared that, "The unflogged man has not been educated".¹ Recently a modern sage, trained in mathematical thinking and given to unproved conclusions, Bertrand Russell, concludes in his "On Education" that "no one should learn how to obey, and no one should attempt to command. . . . Our purposes should be our own, not the result of external authority; and our purposes should never be forcibly imposed on others." The logical outcome of this last clause is that the bringing of children into the world should cease; why should we impose our purpose upon them? Let them stay out of the world; they could apparently remain in the place where Er, the Pamphylian, spent some time according to the revelation in Book X of The Republic. Or go further back still and demand of the Original Purposer :

What, without asking, hither hurried—whence ?
And, without asking, whither hurried—hence ?
Another and another cup to drown
The memory of this impertinence !

¹ ὁμῇ δαρεῖς ἄνθρωπος οὐ παιδεύεται.

No doubt, too, the Sun, if endowed with sentience, as Plato somewhere hints, ought to be apprised of this doctrine of independent purposes so that he may release his hold on Earth and allow her to wander, just as Mr. Russell wanders. But *I* wander. My purpose in citing the title and aims of this journal and then of naming two boundaries for Education as drawn by Mr. Russell and Menander (although the latter was a comic poet and is therefore privileged to talk "phluaria", without expecting it to pass for "sophia") was to give a view of the boundless region in which a professor (well named such) of Education may disport himself. There is no fear of trespass. But stay! Someone whispers, "It's all trespass, you haven't an inch to call your own—except perhaps in Menander's field—he's your man; stick to him". There is some truth in that, I ruefully admit. Educational theory is a mosaic of fragments of sociology, biology, psychology, anthropology and philosophy. Philosophy is a fortunate ally; it has not to work or seek money to enable it to apply its convictions. Its poor relation, education, has to work; its mosaic theory must be paralleled by Protean activities from the right treatment of morons to the training of teachers. In order to "deliver the goods", to quote the beautiful language of Chrematistes, a professional educator must often resort to the stroking of the Great Beast of the Republic, making flattering speeches to business societies, chambers of manufacturers, chambers of commerce, rotary—telling them what noble ideals they cherish, and meantime swallowing the Circæan draught of material values that still has on mankind the effect it had on the comrades of Odysseus. It is a pity Hermes cannot come to us, as to the old adventurer, with the magic herb "moly" to confer immunity against the spells of modern economic life. There is hardly a corner of the university—any university—where the soul of man can be ministered to in its highest reaches without thought of adaptation to practical life, or qualifying for a profession, or learning "something modern". A few days ago an experienced graduate said to a first-year student, "What ever are you doing Greek and French for? Why don't you take chemistry—something vital and connected with all the processes of everyday life?" The same sort of doctrine is preached by the Fords, and sometimes by the Wellses of today.

The biological interpretation or application of Education becoming commoner every day will lead to a city of swine. The true progress of man never began till he became possessed of something that the predecessors of *homo sapiens* never had. The new man stretched out the wings of his imagination—as he flew, he surveyed the whole of time and existence and saw a world of wonder and power that mere animal struggle for existence could never have introduced the contestants to.

As I grow older I feel that those immediately concerned with teaching young people need to come back to a belief in the soul, to a recognition more of the higher possibilities in man than of his lowly origin, to think less of teaching about the neurones and the cerebral cortex than of giving some insight into the fair land of noble thoughts. Great thinking brings uplift. If it is old, so much the better, like cheese and wine and friends.

If any reader has survived to this point (some people will read anything), and if he is a modernist, he will exclaim, "The same old classical obscurantism". Not at all, good sir. The growing theory about the university is that it is a place *pro universis rebus*, especially the useful *rebus*. This theory will justify university courses on "Corset Making" or "How to Get Personality" (*non loquor ignota*). Motor-driving is useful, but it will not furnish the ground work of principles or the systematic superstructure once desiderated in a university course. Home science is good, but —! But perhaps I had better stop. But just let me consider Education as a university subject. Clearly it is dependent on psychology, sociology, biology and philosophy. But it has to make a practical synthesis of all these, and over and above these, it has to give a reasoned body of principles for the guidance of the teacher. It may be said that there is no autonomy in Education, that the Soviets impose on teachers the indoctrination of Bolshevik ideas in their pupils. Fascism does the same, and in a less degree every form of society fetters the spiritual autonomy of its teachers by what it allows in the school curricula. In Russia and Italy and Tennessee and certain political quarters of England (Australia, too, as we learn in New Zealand, is really quite a dreadful sort of place), there may be the deliberate attempt to enchain the mind of teacher and pupil. But in general in civilized countries (and also in Australia) the teacher is allowed to draw pretty freely from the stream of social heredity. What he transmits to his pupils is not a propagandist pabulum nor mere colligation of statements—it is not a depersonalized presentation. Do what he will, the teacher as the intermediary between the content of the curriculum and the pupil must act in a personal, vital way. Of course, the amount of this action can be restricted or thwarted or canalized to party purposes; or still worse, all teachers not favourable to the regnant political views may, as occurred in pre-war Germany, be relegated to comparative obscurity. This fettering of autonomy in content and in method may of course exclude everything but that denied by the ruling power. When that occurs, despair and death or revolution is nigh. But till that occurs (*absit omen!*) Education may fairly be a university subject.

The inevitable dependence of Education on social fact and theory brings its difficulties. An extraordinary polarity

is manifesting itself at present in world politics. Nationalism is at one pole generating internationalism. The planetary mind is above the horizon, unable as yet, it is true, to function properly through want of an international nervous system, yet it is slowly fostering favourable variations in national institutions with the intention of selectively bringing to birth true pan-anthropic organization. At the other pole we find nationalism disintegrating into sectionalism—not the old easy-going sectionalism of political life, but a sectionalism so embittered as to drive each successful “party” in turn to regard itself as the state with power to bully or plunder all unsuccessful parties, and even to bring about a structural alteration in the nation it rose from. This means that the state of today may not be the state of tomorrow. The national sense of continuity is lost in a merciless party tyranny of the iron dictatorship of one man. Some day the conflict may end with the overthrow of the sectional Ahriman and the enthronement of the universal bromasdes. But ere that millennial day, entropy may have closed the terrestrial account for ever.

Meanwhile, any attempt to secure the school pupils in advance for some sectional political scheme is diabolical. If persisted in, it will mean spiritual slavery for multitudes. Luckily, in British communities it has not gone far, though England knows it in her midst. Depressing as this condition is, it is not the only perplexity confronting all educational theory and practice. Each Fach or branch of knowledge tends to segregation; the sense of the unity of mind and of all knowledge is lost, the over-soul or absolute disappears and only the broken lights are visible. The young life, which in the idealistic glow of adolescence acted as a totality, is soon faced with the claims of specialism. The old university with all its shortcomings did achieve something of a completion process.

To start in youth with an intense intellectual curiosity, to ransack the pages of the sages of the world in the hope of discovering the clue to the meaning of life, to learn half a dozen languages or to devote oneself to intense science study for this purpose, to inquire into the origins of religions, to endeavour to appraise Christianity fairly, to search one’s own heart and life, to believe that enlightenment is attainable, to maintain the initial curiosity in unflagging energy on to middle life and beyond it,

Still nursing the unconquerable hope,
Still clutching the inviolable shade,

to endeavour to track down the immortal gleam (or the *ignis fatuus*) which

Pursues me flying, flies when I pursue it,

to adopt now this philosophy, now that, to reform perpetually

one's ideal of life, to go on working hopefully though stepping into each new day as on to a shaky plank over a dark chasm, never turning the back but marching breast forward, and yet to be inly conscious of a lessening certainty or an increasing uncertainty of the spiritual value and meaning of life—this I take is a common fate to multitudes of studying, thinking and teaching men of the present day. But this experience, depressing as it may be, is for those who have it on assurance that there is organically present in their souls

The pleasing hope, the vain desire,
The longing after immortality,

as Addison calls it. Our ordinary presentations of our philosophical tenets are very nebulous and adynamic when projected on to the daily working plane of the emotions and the will. Reticence holds most of us in check. We do not tell all we believe or disbelieve, and we are too often concerned in presenting a consistent schema of our tenets or of criticising others to bestow much thought or the ability of such schema to stand the storm and stress of daily life. Not that I think biological pragmatism is the need of these times. Pragmatism is a philosophy designed to prove that there is no such thing as philosophy possible—it is self-destructive. The theory of evolution as it is being applied to the life spiritual in Education is undoubtedly destroying the sense for the higher values of life. To be efficient, to be adapted to the environment, to be ready to use the mind to meet a given situation, to teach children what life and knowledge are by enabling them to live through social experiences and acquire a sense-basis for all their knowledge—these things are good enough; but when the claim is made for them that they are all-sufficing even in their several limited fields, then a lowering of life is sure to occur.² Mind, it is said, may be regarded as merely a superadded biological means of adjustment; the mind is given us, or has been got by us by a fluke or by some slow and half-conscious grind of Nature; mind helps us to find our way about in the world. This doctrine I reject with contempt. It came to me years ago as a beam of light; I have lived to see that light become a darkness. There is not the faintest shred of evidence in existence to demonstrate what the nature of an idea is. The ordinary physiological subways leading up to the platform of mind necessitate an ascension out of the dark on an invisible escalator up to the light. Furthermore, the mind from the first is something over and above a mere instrument for enabling man to meet a given situation. Observation of a baby should prove that. The evidence that

² It is the over-insistence on this view that is ousting scholarship from universities and enthroning research and technicity in its place. Some of the so-called research done for theses in degrees is such as might be done by a journalist. However, I rejoice to note in Otago an increase in Greek students.

behaviourist Watson collects to support his thesis is the strongest proof against that thesis. "Conditioning" occurs just because the mind is not static, but has the innate power of creating a Gestalt which will embody and account rightly or wrongly all that is presented to it. Phobias would never be acquired in a physiological machine—phobias occur because the mind imagines and creates them first as explanations and secondly as remedies. The same may be said of Freud's theory of the Urvater, Urmord, and all the supposed network of psychic apparatus and determinism woven round them. Without a free-creating, spontaneous imposition by mind of itself on circumstances presented to it, no body of spiritual relations, such as now constitute the fabric of society, could ever have been woven. Freud's two recent books, "Die Zukunft einer Illusion" and "Das Unbehagen in der Kultur", are wildly improbable explanations respectively of the origin of religion and of the discomfort occasioned by the restrictions imposed by civilization.

I am no philosopher. My problem is a practical one—Education. But what am I to educate for? Efficiency? Good. Is that all? No! Man wants and needs art, leisure, sport, religion and a dozen other things not denoted by efficiency. These things inevitably raise questions about value, *i.e.*, philosophy. So that one concerned with Education, particularly in a university, must have a philosophy, or else must be content with the dreadful alternative of imparting knowledge and skill void of all content, but that which has an examination-passing, and therefore an economic, value only. This latter process is materialistic pragmatism in its worst form. But no lecturer on Education can rest there. Inevitably his soul (I believe in the soul) carries him on, indicates, if only dimly, some of the *Eide* it has seen, offers him a view of a better state on earth, a Utopia, than can be a real Topia—in a word it will inevitably offer him practical Christianity. It may be that his intellectualization of such a vision will lead him to believe that the sanctions of and the spurs towards Utopian conduct are to be found solely and totally in human society. He may assert that men have fought and died for the society of troglodytes, of cannibal tribes, of Greek cities, of civilized Christian states without any other stimulus or reward than that of instinct and the opinion of their kin. That is true. But society is only the carrier, not the source of the higher values, as the sun is the carrier, but not the original source of light in the solar system. The unrest in the world today is by no means wholly economic. The loss of spiritual vision among the intelligentsia, accompanied though it be by clear intellectual vision of the work-a-day environment, the decay of the non-material elements in Christianity—even while applied Christianity is daily more manifest in social legislation—has restricted the region of

practical thought more and more to the immediate economic and social needs of life. The peculiar paradox then comes in sight that increase in comfort and in measures for removing hunger and squalor has been accompanied by a growing feeling of dissatisfaction. Not only are the working-classes dissatisfied; the rest of society is dissatisfied. The dissatisfaction may be drugged into anæsthesia by repeated draughts of excitement, but there are temporary anodynes—they conceal, but do not remove the malady. The return of economic prosperity or the re-structure of society on a socialistic or communistic foundation will not effect a remedy. It may be that no remedy is possible till philosophers are kings and kings philosophers; that is, until the illumined soul is sovereign in the state. It may be that mankind is condemned perpetually to strive, to seek and never to find, that ever anxious to escape its prison house *inquietum cor est nostrum donec in Te requiescat*.

I am no physician of the soul, I have no panacea for spiritual depression; and certainly there is no guarantee that, even were the medicine available, others would take it. Still, I am loath to close on a despondent note. My own faith is that the universe has a meaning, that human life has a meaning, that working to better life will make the meaning less obscure, that the gospel of efficiency taken alone is a false gospel, that man has a soul (at least I have), that there is no practical life before the world comparable with that outlined in the New Testament, and that a conscious and constant re-direction of thought towards the soul, its nature and its needs will bring a gradual illumination. Without some such ideal or religion, Education as a university study is merely a statement of what men do under the push of instinct and the enlightenment that comes of competition. But this is not enough. An expositor of Education becomes a preacher in spite of himself. He prophesies of the city whose image is laid up in heaven.

A GLIMPSE OF THE OBVIOUS.

By I. H. SUTHERLAND, M.A.,
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THE conflict between thought and experience is a sharp one, and sways this way and that according as philosophy follows a formal course, or allows itself to be swayed by intimations from the emotional and volitional sides of our nature.

The ancient Greeks, with their wonderful logical power, first stamped out fundamental conceptions or Forms of thought, for apprehending reality. The claims of the intellect were subsumed under the Form of Being, and the claims of experience under the Form of Becoming, and both found their advocates. Plato, who summed up the whole development, gave pride of place to Being, in the more elaborate form of the Platonic Idea, but was not able either to exclude Becoming from his system nor yet to define clearly its relationship to the dominant Form. All this speculation was so well directed that it is hard to see what was left, in this field, for later thinkers to do—except to cover and re-cover the ground that the Greeks had already trod. In the development of Idealism in Germany, in the 19th century we can see, in spite of differences in terminology, that the system of Fichte revolves round the form of Being, the system of Schelling round that of Becoming while the idealism of Hegel, like that of Plato, trips over Becoming and can neither exclude nor yet comfortably include this troublesome concept. In these formal systems, then, it appears that the dominant thought of the unity of all things (Being) is eternally dogged by the after-thought of their diversity (Becoming).

While the formal element is prominent and also essential in philosophy there is another and doubtless deeper element which responds to the march of culture and civilization and entertains suggestions from widely separated fields of knowledge and experience. Natural science has thus acquired a strong influence upon the development of modern philosophy and seems better able to cope with the diversity of nature and especially to elaborate the principle of evolution, which in its original philosophic forms appears somewhat bald and unconvincing. Herbert Spencer thought that the sole task of philosophy was to generalize the results of the particular sciences and put them together under a new and fundamental form of evolution suggested by the science of his time. However, in this system there emerges a rather crude dualism of inner and

outer relations. The interest is directed mainly to physical phenomena and the general tendency is in the direction of a materialistic monism—not, indeed, with the intention of the founder but in spite of that intention. At the other pole we have the “creative evolution” of M. Bergson and the “historical universe” of Alexander expressing idealistic monism and showing an unmistakable relationship to the ancient concept of Becoming. Thus the principle on being grasped by thought breaks in two and reveals its inadequacy unless it can be supplemented by some other concept.

In ethical and religious thinking the distinction between good and evil gives rise to a dualism so strongly marked that in some systems it has become their immovable basis. This is most picturesquely expressed in the Ormuzd and Ahriman of the old Persian mythology, the twin spirits of good and evil, and it appears also in the related Manichæism of the Christian era. But in the long run an uncompromising dualism has proved unacceptable in this sphere, because the sharper the antithesis between spiritual and material the wider the gulf between God and man, and consequently the more imperious becomes the need for reunion. In Christian theory this has been effected, in the first place, by spiritualizing the world of the senses so that the opposition between God and matter disappears. Then, by stressing the principle of the freedom of the will, this theory does indeed suggest an inner antagonism between the finite and the infinite will, but dualism as an outward and original principle is disallowed.

Is it not the case, then, that when we strive most for the unity which the mind craves we are nevertheless compelled to make allowance for diversity; whereas, if our starting point be dualistic we are equally compelled in the development of thought to purge away this dualism? To the cynic this result will doubtless suggest the impotence of speculation, but patience will extract from it a conclusion of lasting value. The real lesson to be learned is that a balanced philosophy needs both a formal and an intuitive element, both unity and diversity, to satisfy the claims of thought, on the one hand, and of experience on the other. But how is such a balance to be attained?

Let us direct attention, in the first place, to the intuitive element. The natural starting-point of modern thought lies in our intuitive certainty of the existence of consciousness, but if this be treated too formally, as in the system of Descartes, a very abstract character is given to what should be valued first and last as an inner experience. Now our experience of consciousness and all its states reveals an inner complexity and also, to some extent at least, an inner conflict that is even painfully real. The unity of the self has a strongly-marked dualism underlying it, and Plato found picturesque expression for this

truth when he divided the soul between the rational nature and the irrational nature that resists it. In any formal system of philosophy, however, the inner conflict does not attract the attention it should, but is sooner or later dismissed on the assumption that it belongs only to the world of phenomena and must disappear in the higher realm of Ideas. Now this formal distinction between phenomena and noumena is one that bristles with difficulty, even on the formal side, for the relation between the two realms evades definition and remains mysterious and unsatisfactory. Starting from a basis in experience we must resist the claims of this formal viewpoint and assert instead those of the more rational conviction that so far as a comprehension of any higher realm of being is at all possible for man it can be gained only after the analogy of human self-knowledge. What ever is deeply true of the self must be true of the Infinite also, and if the soul of man is torn with conflict, then "the whole creation groaneth and travaileth". So we come to the conclusion that the Infinite is involved in a process of evolution, a process which is primarily mental and spiritual and is to be interpreted through its analogy with our own mental life.

The formal objections to any such conclusion are, of course, formidable. It will probably be argued, for instance, that we cannot understand either the beginning or the end of the process, nor the inner dualism that is involved in it. To such objections it is most effective to retort that we cannot understand either the beginning or the end of human consciousness nor the dualism that is involved in it, yet we do not on that account regard the Self as Unknown or Unknowable. On the contrary, we feel that we have a specially profound and intimate knowledge of the Self. It would be unreasonable not to hope for the same kind of knowledge of Deity, and equally unreasonable, surely, to claim more definite knowledge of the greatest reality. It is desirable to find some formula that will gloss over the logical difficulties, but in searching for it we must not lose sight of the principle that in this department of speculation we should be guided by intuition and experience, not by abstract ideas.

The more we exclude formalism from the beginning of our speculation the more essential it will be to do justice to it in the later development of our ideas, for a philosophy without a formal element is not to be thought of. When we come to consider the relation between Deity and the world we will have full opportunity to make amends for any preceding neglect of the claims of systematic thought. The general line of advance might be somewhat as follows. The nature of the cosmic evolution is presumably reflected most clearly in the micro-cosmic evolution of the human spirit as revealed in the history of civilization and culture, and therefore this would become the central study on the formal side. As regards evolution in its

more restricted scientific connotation it would be necessary to show that the same creative activity is at work here as in higher realms, only in a more suppressed way. It might be argued, for instance, that the various "new starts" and brusquer variations that interrupt the ordinary course of evolution are prompted by the workings of this creative power, underlying the ostensibly mechanical sequence of events. As in the human sphere, so in every other it would be maintained that we can understand the macrocosm only by reference to the microcosm, and *vice versa*. Finally, a conviction of the fundamental reality and importance of time would be strongly held. The past would be surrendered to the analysis of systematic thought, the present and future would be reserved for the intimations of intuition and experience, and so the conflicting claims of unity and diversity would be in a fair way to obtain satisfaction and reconciliation.

What has long seemed obvious to the writer is the idea outlined above of a cosmic creative evolution, and it is certain that the same or a similar idea has suggested itself to others. But, however natural as a starting-point of thought, the idea must be carefully developed before it will commend itself to thinkers generally. If the above attempts to grapple with a novel idea are sufficiently interesting to promote criticism and discussion the writer will be amply repaid for his efforts.

EARTHQUAKE PSYCHOLOGY.

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No earthquake is heralded by warning omens, and a colossal situation of surprise was created in the city of Napier and throughout the entire province of Hawkes Bay on the morning of Tuesday, February 3. At 10.47 a.m., when business had settled down to its full daily routine, and the minds of citizens were occupied with the ordinary details of everyday life, giving much less warning than the proverbial thunderclap, and preceded merely by a dull subterranean rumble, the earthquake came. In less than two minutes a city of 19,000 people was transformed into a chaotic confusion of ruins, out of which terrorized and bewildered citizens extricated themselves and found places of greater safety. Before the expiry of twenty-four hours a relentless holocaust had swept the heart of the city and transformed some thirteen or fourteen business blocks into heaps of smoking débris. A similar account can be given of Port Ahuriri, two or three miles distant at the water-front, and also of Hastings fourteen miles away, while the smaller town of Wairoa, situated seventy miles north of Napier, shared in the general disaster. For the purposes of this review it will be sufficient to restrict oneself to that central area, the destruction of which the writer was an eye-witness.

Reflection upon one's own mental processes during the experiences of that day and of the following few weeks affords a number of arresting psychological features, and the writer had many opportunities both for introspective analysis and also for investigating the experiences of others. In their way most people nowadays seem to have a smattering of psychological method, and many of them gave very interesting accounts of their feelings and reactions both at the time and subsequently when the first shock had worn off. It is impossible here to record these in anything like detail, but probably a general summary of one's conclusions may be of value.

The first impact of shock seemed in most cases to produce a strong reaction of fear. All instinctively, and more or less blindly, sought exits from buildings, preferring to face death out of doors than to run the risk of being trapped inside. In some instances this blind unreasoning reaction seemed to precipitate death or serious injury. People rushed out without

really considering where they were going, or whether they were likely to incur greater risk by so doing. One lady, for example, is known to have rushed frantically out of a shop only to be crushed to death by a parapet which fell on the pavement outside. Some claimed that their seemingly miraculous escapes were due to being obliged to remain at their posts, either from the stern sense of duty which made them master their terror, or because exits were blocked. When the first fall of débris was over and the big upheaval lasting a minute and a half had spent itself, they were able to think more calmly, and avoid unnecessary danger while threading their way to safety. One man, who for some reason or other suffered from a kind of earthquake complex, was employed in a room on the first floor. At the very first quiver he jumped through the glass window and fell upon the shop verandah below. Though afterwards destroyed by fire, the building withstood the earthquake itself, but this survivor sustained severe cuts from the window glass and abrasions from his fall upon the steel framework of the verandah.

In some instances the fear-reflex acted as an instinctive recoil from danger causing people to leap impulsively into positions of greater safety. A shop-assistant humourously described himself as a true "counter-jumper". His counter was situated at one side of the department, next to a brick party-wall. At the very first tremor he vaulted the counter right into the middle of the department and turned to see the falling wall shatter the timbers where he had been standing an instant before. A typiste told of the inexplicable impulse which led her to crouch under the table while the brick wall in front fell into the street. Her table was covered with bricks, and the machine was damaged, but she herself was able to pick her way out unhurt over the pile of débris.

Such stories of miraculous escapes might be multiplied considerably did space permit. It was interesting to note that none of those to whom one spoke were able to give any clear reason for what they did, but there was decided unanimity in speaking of what one termed "the mysterious impulse" which seemed to command them for the moment. It is evident that for longer or shorter periods, varying with individual temperament and training, the ordinary rational functions were short-circuited by the more impulsive and instinctive reactions of fear, amounting in some instances to blind panic.

Precise psychology demands a more detailed analysis of the effects of fear, and some indication of various qualifying factors which seemed to affect its operation.

To anyone following up a systematic inquiry it soon became evident that fear had produced two quite opposite conditions: on the one hand, a complete *locomotor ataxia*, and on the other,

a pronounced motor reflex. With some the intense horror of the whole situation seemed to cause temporary physical paralysis. Those who had passed through this phase of experience spoke afterwards of their strange inability to move, or even to think of moving. A number stated that they had been, as it were, transfixed by the vision of awful catastrophe. It seemed in their case as if the sheer force of terror destroyed all physical response. Various terms were used in describing this condition. For one it assumed the form of "bewilderment", intense mental confusion prevailing for the time being. Another would speak of having been "chilled" or "frozen", while there were yet others who remarked on having felt "numb" or "stunned", as if by a severe blow. (This was the more remarkable as being mentioned by some who had escaped without even a bruise.) The particular metaphor does not matter very much, as one may draw the general conclusion that this result was probably due to the failure of the sensory stimulus to produce a complete nervous and physical response. Probably on account of the intense emotional reactions produced by the unusual and excessive stimulus, the afferent current failed for the time being to effect the proper efferent discharge, so that the subject thus affected remained in a state of helpless immobility. One cannot but wonder to what extent this was responsible for some of the fatalities that were reported.

We have already remarked that in many cases there was a pronounced reflex movement in response to the sudden reaction of fear, and those who experienced it instinctively jumped or ran from the dangerous localities in which they had been overtaken by the earthquake. One young man, for example, told how he had scrambled underneath a standing motor-lorry, remaining there until the first impulse of panic had spent itself and self-control was re-asserted. This was done, he said, quite impulsively and without conscious thought. When he did begin to exercise his powers of judgment, he realized the insecurity of his refuge, and hastened into the middle of the street. His story was the more remarkable on account of the fact that he attributed his escape to the later action. Soon after he had attained his new position a cantilever verandah tore free from the stanchions of the building and thundered down, wrecking the lorry under which he had momentarily sheltered.

Reflection upon the accounts obtained from very different people has suggested that the precise form of response to the impulse of fear was determined by several factors. The writer found it difficult to make anything like an exact study of any individuals or groups of individuals with a view to classifying them according to temperament. But from the short and scrappy conversations which were afforded, it seemed as if individual temperament was a powerful determinant. In the

absence of exact detail one naturally hesitates to frame definite statements of the general effects of temperament, and the writer's own removal from the district made it impossible to gather and tabulate sufficient data upon which these might safely be based. The general impression was formed, however, that the extreme phenomena of fear belonged to the more highly-strung temperaments. Naturally, the more phlegmatic temperaments did not react in so pronounced a manner, whereas the greatest extremes would seem to affect the more sensitive dispositions.

Had it been possible to make comparisons between the sexes, there is little doubt that these would have yielded very interesting results. It must be remembered that early all the women and children had been evacuated from Napier for practically the whole period during which the writer was able to follow up his investigations. While a few women remained, the data afforded were far too scanty to be of much general value. One always had the suspicion that those who remained might happen to adhere too closely to one or two particular types. Whether this doubt was well- or ill-founded it rested upon the feeling that certain types would eagerly seize the opportunity afforded by the authorities to find temporary refuges in places outside the earthquake zone. In some instances, even after the restoration of the municipal services disorganized by the disaster, pressure had to be used to effect the return of some refugees who seemed to be reluctant to re-enter the zone. This fact evidently suggests that the complete account of the sexual incidence of fear reactions could only be furnished after the inclusion of such absentees. It has been our regret that this opportunity for full investigation has been denied.

However, within a few minutes of the first big shock, we visited many groups of women gathered on adjacent lawns. All were quite evidently under great distress, some being distraught and even hysterical with panic. A few quickly regained composure and began to infect the crowd around them with their calmer spirit. Some of these previously known to the writer, undoubtedly belonged to the more practical and self-contained type. On the other hand, a most pronounced case of hysteria was that of a lady who had previously suffered from "nerves". This, perhaps, is insufficient ground for any binding conclusion, but, on the other hand, it may prove to be the straw that indicates the direction of the wind.

While the most casual observer could have seen the very evident distress and fear of these women under the first shock of the earthquake, it is unsafe to jump to the conclusion that there was any greater female sensitivity to such reactions. It is usual to ascribe this to the so-called "weaker" sex, and

one did not actually receive any definite contradiction of the popular view. At the same time, there were undoubtedly deeds of distinct and most praiseworthy heroism on the part of many women, and in the face of such facts, one dare not be so unchivalrous as to give cheap and easy support to any sweeping popular notion. Furthermore, on the other hand, it is beyond question that some men at the time behaved in a hysterical and panic-stricken manner. Certain names were held up to ridicule and the general gossip of the camps stigmatized them with contempt. One has to avoid hearsay evidence in the formation of one's judgments, but there is usually some ground for the stories which float about in that way. There is no doubt that instances of extreme and violent emotional reaction occurred amongst both men and women. One does not mention this in any derogatory way. One who has experienced all that the earthquake meant cannot hold any other attitude than that of very great sympathy for all one's fellow-citizens at that time. But the statement ought to be made as a record of plain fact.

The general male characteristics were not directly witnessed, and afterwards the observer found it difficult to penetrate the rationalizing mask which most men assume when subsequently reflecting upon their reactions to shock. What was found of the accounts of men in wartime of their baptism of fire seems to apply in this case. Usually, when there is a general discussion between members of a crowd, the real experiences are camouflaged. Very few men will ever admit that the situation aroused any degree of fear, or even of nervous reaction. It was only by private and intimate conversation with a few individuals here and there that a more faithful account was elicited. This process of cross-examination the writer was unable to complete, partly through the pressure of his professional duties and partly through removal from the town. It is sufficient just to conclude with this statement, that no one was met with who failed to admit, whatever the temperament or sex, that the first tremendous shock of the earthquake was in some measure, at least, unnerving. In point of fact, it was noticeable that those who made light of nerviness and scorned any emotion of fear, were newcomers since the earthquake, probably visiting the city for the purposes of the various forms of relief. On the whole, their making light of the experiences of fear or nervousness, was rather resented by the genuine earthquake survivor. It was this attitude of resentment often strongly assumed by *bona fide* Napier residents that afforded some clue to a reconstruction of their actual feelings on the earthquake day itself. It would seem to be another phase of the old saying, "He jests at scars who never felt a wound".

No account of the self-regarding functions would be complete without a brief reference to the modifying power exercised upon

the emotion of fear by previous training and disposition. The full analysis of the relation of social instincts, to earthquake phenomena is a subject apart, but it ought at least to be noted here that in a great many cases fear was repressed by the sense of duty, or by concern for the welfare of relatives and friends, and in general by the influence of social sentiments. Any who were in positions of trust were so imbued with the sense of duty as for the most part to refuse to forsake their posts until it became absolutely necessary to do so. They sought to do everything possible to safeguard business interests, or protect stocks and business records and equipment, or else to rescue buried employees and workmates. With few exceptions, all doctors and nurses at once responded to the traditions of their profession and toiled heroically in the alleviation of suffering. Under the most trying conditions, and very sorely handicapped by the destruction of proper equipment, surgeons worked long hours in dressing stations improvised in tents pitched in the open in blazing sunlight, quite forgetting their own nervousness in their response to the call of the injured. There seemed to be clear evidence in these things of the effect of tradition and training so far as the control of impulsive reactions was concerned.

The various forms of the more sentimental phenomena and the psychological after-effects of the earthquake will be considered at length in a further article. The object of the present article has, however, been achieved in indicating that the immediate effect of shock is to stimulate the more elemental emotional reactions not peculiar to the human personality, but in many respects possessing characteristics exhibited in more general animal behaviour under similar conditions. Even the modification of such emotional responses, while indicating the demarcation between man and the lower animals, was in itself illuminating. Later in time, if first in importance, it reminded the observer that, under certain conditions, the self-regarding instinct undoubtedly leaps into prominence, and immediately, through the pressure of fear, produces definite physical reactions. The re-assertion of self-control, and the modification of fear by social sentiment is later, but the temporary suspension of these seems to lay bare the elemental sub-stratum of the human mind.

REVIEWS.

S. AGOSTINO : PUBBLICAZIONE COMMEMORATIVA DEL XV CENTENARIO DELLA SUA MORTE. Published by the Faculty of Philosophy of the Sacred Heart University, Milan. 1931. (*Società Editrice "Vita e Pensiero"*.) Price : 50 Lire.

That the fifteenth centenary of the death of St. Augustine should have been celebrated with a solemnity that included the issue of a majestic papal Encyclical and the publication of a host of writings in many languages on things Augustinian, ought not to be a matter of much surprise. "The Church", wrote Gaston Boissier many years ago ("La fin du Paganisme", I, p. 291) "looks upon the conversion of St. Augustine as one of the greatest events of her history. She celebrates a special feast in commemoration of it every year during May (now announced in the "Roman Martyrology" under date of April 24). This is an honour that she attributes to no other except St. Paul, and in thus assimilating the disciple to the master she seems to say that she owes almost as much to the one as to the other." But it is not merely as a theological luminary second only to the Apostle of the Gentiles that Saint Augustine claims an immortality which the world will ever regard as his due. Humanity will always love him because the history of his heart is a universal human history. It has been well said that the "Confessions" of St. Augustine are the confessions of all those who read them. It is not only a sonnet-singer like Petrarch that can find himself in them; one of the most marvellous blends of the human and the divine that the Christian centuries have seen in pure womanhood, namely, Saint Teresa of Avila, saw herself described in the "Confessions". The portrait drawn by the son of Monica is true to nature and it can justly claim to be the work of the greatest painter of antiquity. The twentieth century believer in nothing absolute, can verify for himself in this examination of conscience made aloud, that man, in the age of aeroplanes and wireless telephony, is the same psychological type as the men that saw Alaric sack Rome.

The literary, philosophical, theological and spiritual influence of Augustine has never ceased. Jacques Bénigne Bossuet whose genius was perhaps nearest to the Augustinian prototype, is not the last to call him the "Eagle of Doctors". In our own day not only Catholics but Protestants have vied with one another in extolling the greatness of his unique personality. "Where", writes Harnack ("Dogmengeschichte", III, p. 95) "is there to be found, in the history of the West, a man who in point of influence can be compared to him?" Rudolf Eucken goes further still when he says: "On the ground of Christianity proper one great philosopher has appeared, and that is Augustine. . . . All the influences of the past, as well as all the forces of his own age, he gathered within himself to form them into something great and new. Though rooted in a Latin soil, he was open to strong Greek and Oriental influences. From primitive Christianity and Neo-Platonism he elaborated a new system, in which, despite its originality, the Christian element predominates, and although the whole may be open to discussion, it will dominate the entire history of Christendom." (Cited by Nebreda, "*Bibliographia Augustiniana*", Rome, 1928.)

These words contain a misconception of Christianity, but they express a eulogy of Augustine which echoes the chorus of thousands of authoritative voices. Though in no sense a mere philosopher, honourable as the title may be, the Bishop of Hippo has found few equals in the philosophical firmament. It is no wonder then that philosophers have been as enthusiastic as the theologians in celebrating his centenary.

The commemoration has evoked quite a number of volumes. Not to speak of Etienne Gilson's magnificent "Introduction à l'étude de saint

Augustin"—claiming relationship with both Harvard and the Sorbonne but not strictly a commemorative book—English and French writers co-operated to produce the worthy "Monument to Saint Augustine", published by Sheed and Ward (London, 1930) and in France the "Archives de Philosophie" gave an entire *cahier* of 270 pages to six specialistic studies on the Saint as a philosopher. Lastly, the volume of 510 dense pages which is the occasion of this review-article, comes as a fitting tribute from the neo-scholastic Professors of the Sacred Heart University of Milan.

As the thing denoted by the hyphenated term "review-article" is not rigidly predetermined, it seems best to be brief with regard to the contents of this volume and to use the liberty given by the hyphen. That will allow us the privilege of making a few remarks on points of Augustinian philosophy which have been only just suggested by the Milanese monument to the memory of one of Milan's quondam Professors of Rhetoric. The monument has been devotedly erected to the genius of Augustine by the Faculty of Philosophy of the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, and besides the fine centenary Encyclical of the present Milanese Successor of St. Peter, it contains papers from the Rector Magnificus and seventeen of his colleagues. We propose, while mentioning the themes of these papers, to insert a word of special appreciation or criticism only where we experienced particularly definite impressions of interest or ennui.

Father Gemelli endeavours to find a summary synthesis of the eternal essence of Augustinianism. Confining his study to the unique monument of intellectual and moral self-revelation which Augustine has left us in his "Confessions", he concludes—very happily and very truly, we think—that it is in the consciousness at once humble and joyful of human insufficiency and divine sufficiency, both finding their great rallying-ground in the mystery of the Word Incarnate, that the eternity of Augustinianism really consists. In the second paper Professor Masnovo discusses St. Augustine's specifically psychological and interioristic ascent towards God, as it appears in the "Confessions". The question of cosmic cycles of evolution or more properly that of an eternal world is treated with remarkable competence by the Professor of Cosmology. Of special interest are the observations which show the author's up-to-date acquaintance with the theories and findings of modern science. Contrary to the expectation aroused by the title, we found the next contribution on "Saint Augustine's *De Magistro* and the Intuitive Method" a most fascinating piece of philosophico-theological pedagogy. We can hardly say as much for the rather germanically lumpy treatment of the Augustinian principle of autogenesis. However, the texts relative to this basic element in the Saint's gnoseology are marshalled in a way that a student of the question would no doubt be grateful for. Dom Vismara, lecturer in mediæval and modern history, treats us to a long comparison of Saint Augustine and Giambattista Vico as claimants of the title of Philosopher of History. His conclusion is a decided preference for the vision set forth by the author of *De Civitate Dei* over its eighteenth century rival. Vico's work, he holds, falls short of being scientific, while his vast systematized panorama proves to be narrow, dry and cold. Augustine's work, on the other hand, is too grandiose to be mere science. It is better described as superscientific, embodying, in spite of its digressive texture, a drama of light and sweetness such as only an historico-dogmatic view of the world could create.

If any part of the commemorative volume may be described as purely philosophical, it ends at this point. The five papers that follow deal with subjects that chiefly interest the theologian, though some of them are almost as philosophical as the Angelology of St. Thomas Aquinas. The titles are: The Causality of Efficacious Grace in St. Augustine's Conception, A Psychological Analysis of the Act of Faith as Conceived by St. Augustine, His *De Civitate Dei* as a Theology Rather than a Philosophy of History, His Teaching on Lying and His Controversy on the Subject with St. Jerome, The Anti-augustinianism of Jansenius. These contributions show how much the acute philosophical thinking of the Bishop of Hippo was a function of his theology.

The Platonic instrument that he brought to his work of understanding, stating and giving rational coherence to the scattered truths of divine revelation, was not indeed the scientific thing that enabled the genius of Aquinas to construct a system of theology which is the greatest achievement of the wonderful thirteenth century, but, imperfect as it was, Neo-Platonism was for Augustine a stepping-stone to a luminous statement of the main rational theses that will always stand as the groundwork of a perennial Christian philosophy. In the presence of this fact we cannot help feeling that it was Queen Theology that thus saved the virginity of her handmaid, preserving her from the influence of those seductive views that have not been able to stand the test of our greatest natural judge of truth, common sense. The study of the gigantic work of men like Augustine and Aquinas deepens our regret that modern philosophy outside of Catholic schools is so persistent in upholding her pseudo-scientific divorce from divine science with its higher lights. If Christianity is true, then no philosophy that decides on walking no more with her can hope to avoid those wind-tossings of human opinion which have led to despair in the search for absolute truth and the pursuit of a classification of experimental facts as the best that mere man can aspire to. Wisdom has been dropped for the sake of science because philosophy has repudiated her natural alliance with the supernatural.

In what may be regarded as the third or most positive section of the book we find papers on Augustine's relation to law, history and art. A dissertation on the contacts between Roman law and Patristic texts presents us with a formidable collation of juridical maxims and terms found in Augustinian sources and serving to illustrate the influence which might be attributed to Augustine in the Christianization of juridical custom and practice in the Roman Empire. Although the author, after a general introduction on the relations between Roman law and the Christian Fathers, restricts his Augustinian researches to *jus privatum*, the contribution is such as ought to rejoice the heart of a student of legal history and fill a would-be lay reader with dismay. Another review of Augustinian references to marriage and property exhausts the juridical contributions. Two papers follow on Augustine's writings as a subject of interest to the historian of antiquity. Two more deal with his artistic influence and the volume closes with a bibliographical note on an Ambrosian Codex of a trecento Italian version of *De Civitate Dei*.

Naturally, a collection of papers like this embodying the work of eighteen University Professors cannot be covered by any single adjective in the critical vocabulary. It would be a miracle if it was uniformly excellent from beginning to end, but as far as our limited knowledge of such a wide range of Augustinian research allows us to judge in the present case, there is no paper in the volume which does not bear the stamp of competent learning. Characteristic Italian lucidity and facile manipulation of abstract ideas are observable in almost all the contributions. There is one criticism, however, which we feel justified in levelling at the volume as a unit. It does not confine itself to any particular field of Augustinian thought, and gives one only a disjointed idea of Augustinian thought as a whole. From this point of view the English "Monument to St. Augustine" is much more satisfactory, for its ten papers exhibit a very fine portrait of Augustine as a philosopher, sociologist and man of letters.

This stricture on the Italian volume does not, however, imply that it fails to pencil some of the outstanding features of the intellectual portrait of the great man it commemorates. To use an expression employed in the compiler's note at the head of the English "Monument", sufficient quarrying has been done in quarters more or less contiguous to show us the lineaments of the philosopher and theologian, and give us some inkling that Augustine was great in many other spheres. After all, we must not expect too much when there is question of doing even a little justice to the figure of one who "resumes and condenses in his writings the treasures of the ancient world and transmits them to the modern world".

It might seem out of place and even presumptuous to endeavour to put into the few concluding pages of this brief article a statement of some characteristics of the essentially episodic presentation of his philosophic thought left us by St. Augustine. It is difficult to sum up the mind of a genius in any department, and as a great German systematizer of the Augustinian philosophy says, "*Augustin gehört zu jenen Geistern in welchen hundert andere wohnen*". However, we shall attempt to put into a few condensed paragraphs a notion of his general mentality and of a few peculiarities of his philosophy.

To describe the temper of his vast mind would mean not only a diagnosis of his native qualities of intellect, will, imagination and heart, but also a description of the shaping forces that went to determine their orientation and activity. That is obviously impossible; so a few *obiter dicta* must suffice. Augustine as a philosopher was undoubtedly of the lineage of Plato, but he combines in his wonderful personality the qualities of deep scientific rigour that characterize an Aristotle. Let one read a page of Thomas Aquinas, and read another by Augustine on the same or a similar subject. The pupil of Aristotle holds up truth in the pure white light in which it is seen by his own intellectual gaze and we are charmed by the radiant splendour of the evidence. The Christian Plato holds up the same or a kindred truth in the mystic light of a vision in which evidence glows with a heat that warms the whole soul. Aquinas bears as his emblem a sun shining on his breast, Augustine bears a burning heart in his hand. The interpenetration of stern logic and tender feeling has enormous advantages, but it also has disadvantages and there is much truth in the adage "*Augustinus eget Thoma interprete*". Augustine must not, however, be conceived as one who thought with his heart, and he would never have endorsed the dictum of Pascal: "*Le cœur a des raisons que la raison ne connaît pas.*" A devoted student of Augustinianism, Eugène Portalié, has summed up the equilibrium of the Saint's faculties thus: "Great intellectuality admirably fused with an enlightened mysticism, is Augustine's distinguishing characteristic. Truth is not for him only an object of contemplation; it is a good that must be possessed, that must be loved and lived by. What constitutes Augustine's genius is his marvellous gift of embracing truth with all the fibres of his soul; not with the heart alone, for the heart does not think; not with the mind alone, for the mind grasps only the abstract, or, as it were, lifeless truth. Augustine seeks the living truth, and even when he is combating certain Platonic ideas, he is of the family of Plato, not of Aristotle. He belongs indisputably to all ages, because he is in touch with all souls, but he is pre-eminently modern, because his doctrine is not the cold light of the School; he is living and penetrated with personal sentiment. Religion is not a simple theory; Christianity is not a series of dogmas; it is also a life, as they say nowadays, or more accurately, a source of life. But let us not be deceived. Augustine is not a sentimentalist, a pure mystic, and heart does not account for his power. If in him the hard, cold intellectuality of the metaphysician gives place to an impassioned vision of truth, the truth is the basis of it all. He never knew the vaporous mysticism of our day that allows itself to be lulled by a vague aimless sentimentalism. His emotion is deep, true, engrossing, precisely because it is born of a strong, secure, accurate dogmatism that wishes to know what it loves and why it loves. Christianity is life, but life in the eternal, unchangeable truth. And if none of the Fathers has put so much of his heart into his writings, neither has any turned on truth the searchlight of a stronger, clearer intellect."

Almost feminine delicacy of feeling, poetry, life, personality, amazing power of psychological observation and portrayal, all blend harmoniously with powerful intellectualism in Augustine. The title "Prince of Doctors" is an admission that he is greater than Aquinas, but it remains true that the works of the Master are best read with the dictionary supplied by his greatest Aristotelian disciple.

The first thing to remember in the study of Augustinianism is that it begins in an act of adhesion to the supernatural order. Such act performs the twofold function of delivering the will from the yoke of the passions, and the

mind from the dominion of scepticism. This adhesion given, there is no line of division drawn between the two orders, for Augustine wants to be a complete philosopher, holding that the only reason a man has for philosophizing is the attainment of happiness. Such a philosopher will seek to warm rather than to illuminate, and it is the more digressive order of charity that he will follow rather than the scientific order of the intellect. The order is consequently not one of synthesis, but of focalization, the focus being always God, the Source of numbers, the Rule of truth, the Supreme Good, Essential Wisdom, the Ocean towards which the rivers of the City of God unceasingly run.

In spite of this primacy of will and of charity, Augustinianism cannot fairly be called a voluntaristic philosophy, for in the order of being there is no such primacy. God is absolute Being, in which simplicity excludes all priority and man having a will without intelligence is a contradiction. Even in the order of action the necessary rôle and eminent dignity of intelligence are not forgotten. Yet it is true that Charity organizes the whole Augustinian scheme of wisdom, for God, the Object of charity is the Cause of all physical creation, the End of all morality, the Light of all logic, the Salvation of all society.

In this spirit St. Augustine sets out on his quest. His programme is "*Deum et animam scire cupio. Nihilne plus? Nihil omnino*". The soul's first object is itself, and for Augustine the soul's apprehension of itself is the first of all evidences and the criterion of truth. The soul becomes better known than the body for even sensation more immediately testifies the existence of the soul, which, by *attention* to an external impression produces sensation. It is through the soul, too, rather than through the body or the external world that he makes his logical ascent to God in terms that are reducible to the fourth way of St. Thomas Aquinas, namely, the argument from the gradation of being, the *maxime tale* in St. Augustine's process being God the Supreme Truth.

It would be interesting to follow St. Augustine as he proves the immortality of the human soul, develops the theory of knowledge with its points of contact with Platonic reminiscence and the Aristotelian doctrine of abstraction, unfolds his teaching on God and creation and Providence, on free will and the origin of evil, but there is no place here even to touch on these things. Within the limits of forty-two octavo pages a masterly sketch of the whole philosophy of St. Augustine is given by M. C. D'Arcy, S.J., in the English "Monument" mentioned above.

The thought of St. Augustine can be studied with substantial satisfaction in his two greatest works, the "Confessions" and "*De Civitate Dei*". It is fascinating to accompany him on the two kin pilgrimages of his own soul and of the City of God. We can catch some of the beauty of it all in some words addressed to the Almighty in the last book of his praises for the good and the bad things of his life. "My weight is my love; thereby I am borne, whithersoever I am borne. We are inflamed, by Thy gift we are enkindled; and are carried upwards; we glow inwardly and are carried forwards. We ascend *Thy ways that be in our heart* and sing a *song of degrees*; we glow inwardly with Thy fire, with Thy good fire, and we go; because we go upwards to the peace of Jerusalem."

W. LEONARD.

FUNCTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE FUNCTIONAL CONCEPTION OF EDUCATION. L'Éducation Fonctionnelle, 1931. By Dr. Ed. Claparède. Delachaux & Niestlé, S.A., Neuchatel.

This book of the eminent Professor of Experimental Psychology at the University of Geneva is a collection of recent articles bearing on education considered from the viewpoint of Functionalism. The book is given a certain unity by a relatively long introductory chapter in which the author gives a clear exposition of Functional Psychology. As befits the Genevan Psycho-

logist, he offers a spirited vindication of J. J. Rousseau as the first systematic exponent of the functional conception of childhood. The collection includes articles on diverse subjects, all viewed in the light of Functional Psychology : Psychology of Intelligence and of the Will, Necessity of studying children's interests, Psychology of "l'école active", Functional method of teaching languages, Education and Democracy, Why do we yawn?, Education is life and not preparation for life.

The Psychology underlying this conception of education has been given great prominence in English-speaking countries by the well-known books of John Dewey and his school. His article, "The reflex arc concept in Psychology" (*Psych. Rev.*, 1896) marks the beginning of the Chicago School of Functionalism. The controversy between Angell, the Functionalist, and Titchener, the Structuralist, has made clear the difference between the two systems. The Structuralist, influenced by ideals of pure experimental science, studies mental processes from the point of view of their contents and describes these in terms of their analytical elements. The Functionalist, influenced by the biological theories of Spencer and Darwin, goes further and regards these processes as means by which the organism adapts itself to the environment so as to satisfy its biological needs. Thus Structuralism or Existentialism considers and tries to measure what is, whereas Functionalism considers what is to be, is essentially teleological and is dynamic and not static. As usual, we find in this book also a chapter justifying the right of teleological considerations to a place in science. The justification offered by Claparède is mainly pragmatic, their proved fruitfulness. He insists, however, that Functionalism does not imply acceptance of finalism as an ultimate principle of explanation. "For explanations in terms of purpose are no explanations (if by 'explain' we mean to reduce the process to a mechanical model), they but testify to our ignorance."

It seems clear that these two standpoints should not be considered as mutually exclusive. In the study of the physical aspects of our bodies it is useful to consider not only the anatomical structure and the physiological working of each part but also the biological meaning of each part in the development, maintenance and furtherance of the whole living organism. In the study of mental life there appears no reason why we should limit ourselves to the structure and mechanism of mental abilities and close our eyes to the biological reasons for their rise and development. From the practical point of view of education these considerations are bound to prove very useful.

One experiences a feeling of relief in reading that Claparède does not claim the term of "New Psychology" for his system. He maintains that there is but one Psychology, one science of mental activity, in spite of many psychological viewpoints such as atomism and configurationism, introspectionism and behaviourism, comprehensionism and experimentalism, mechanism and hornicism, structuralism and functionalism. Since Psychology began to lead an independent existence, it has manifested a tendency to multiply itself without control and Psychologists as a body begin to feel ashamed at the birth of a "New Psychology". But Functionalism claims to be only a new method of approach. "Mental activity can be considered from various angles which differ from one another according to the aim or problem the investigator has put to himself, and which, far from being contradictory, converge towards one goal, the understanding of behaviour and its laws" (page 43).

Functional Psychology considers mental life as an instrument of the living organism. A living organism is a system which tends to maintain itself in its integrity. As soon as its internal (Physico-chemical) equilibrium is disturbed, as soon as it begins to break up, it brings about the activity necessary to restore the equilibrium. Life is the continual readjustment of an equilibrium continually disturbed. The function of every reaction is the maintenance or restoration of the integrity of the organism. A need is the disturbance of this equilibrium. A tendency is the more specifically

dynamic aspect of a need, a tendency is dependent on a need (pages 56, 57, 68). Functional considerations allow of laws being established which express constant relations between certain modes of behaviour and certain situations. Claparède propounds ten such laws: the first six concern the springs of activity and the other four the direction of activity or external behaviour. The first series includes the laws of need, of extension of mental life, of awareness, of anticipation and two laws regarding interest.

The law of need states that every need tends to call forth the activity adapted to its satisfaction. The corollary is that an activity is always aroused by a need. We are duly warned against the slovenly use of the term stimulus. "In order that the external stimulus may effect a reaction, it is necessary that the organism experience a need to react" (page 59). "The need is indispensable to sensitize the organism in regard of the stimulus—it is only through the intermediary of a need that the stimulus produces the reaction—it is the need which is the motive power of our behaviour" (page 60).

The system of needs has two levels: the present and future needs of the organism. Sometimes the function of behaviour is to restore the actually disturbed equilibrium, at other times it is to protect the organic equilibrium from being disturbed; it does this by means of defense-mechanisms with which the organism has equipped itself in the life of the race or of the individual. The actual disturbance of this signaling apparatus prevents the endangered disturbance of the organism itself. "The whole of mental activity is nothing but one of these protective mechanisms, we might say the protective mechanism *par excellence*, since mental activity is above all an activity of foresight, and protection implies foresight" (page 63). These protective mechanisms have an equilibrium of their own, their own needs and a relatively independent life; thus intellectual life most often has no immediate relation to the actual needs of vegetative life, but this independence is never complete, and all mental as well as physiological activity is in the last resort under the control of organic needs.

This theory, that mental needs are functionally reducible to organic needs, has to explain that the hero, who voluntarily and most disinterestedly sacrifices his life without thought of something better for himself in exchange, seems in no way prompted by the need of preserving his organic integrity. Claparède recognizes that "these exceptions to the rule, in which the individual pursues a goal higher than the maintenance of his own existence, present a thorny problem to biological Psychology". There may, however, be exceptions to a grammatical rule without destruction of the rule, but no theory can survive a factual exception. On the other hand, unless we cut the Gordian knot by a recourse to promptings of grace or impelling instincts of a deified Nature, every theory, accepting that action is consequent on feeling and that pleasure does not differ qualitatively, has to face the difficulty that "ends that far transcend those of merely 'individual' value can be pursued". (J. Ward, *Ps. Pr.*, 397.) If we understand this theory in the sense that genetically mental needs are awakened, directed and strengthened by organic needs, it would seem that little objection can be raised against such a bread-and-butter theory. Claparède is indeed careful to draw our attention to the fact that Functional Psychology does in no way pretend to be a theory on the ultimate nature of mental activity. It limits its ambition to presenting a method of approach and formulating a number of laws.

The nature of mental needs seems indeed different from that of physiological needs. To take only the cognitive ability: physiological hunger will be satisfied by a limited quantity of food, but mental hunger increases in direct proportion to the amount of knowledge gained. This may be due to the illimited number of knowable objects such that the understanding of one makes us aware of the necessity of understanding the next. But the very fact that the mind, as it grasps, becomes more eager to grasp further, and never experiences satiety, seems in favour of a radical difference between mental and physiological needs. Poincaré wrote: "It is knowledge which

is the aim, and action but the means." This experience Claparède considers as an "evolutionist" illusion.

According to the *law of anticipation* "every need, which by its nature is in danger of not being immediately satisfied, appears in advance, before life is endangered" (page 74). There exists a margin between the apparition of a need and the moment when the organic disturbance, of which this need is a sign, becomes really dangerous; it is the presence of this margin which makes scientific curiosity and activity appear as completely disinterested. The scientist may expend nervous energy without profit to his own organism, but it is an illusion if he thinks that in the last analysis the dynamic factor is his thirst for knowledge; that factor may be the need of ever better preparing the race for adaptation to its environment (page 76). This seems the explanation favoured by Claparède. Is it not a mere formula in terms of purpose hiding our ignorance? Every acceptable theory must stand the crucial test of not tearing, when forcibly extended to the few refractory facts that apparently refuse to be drawn under its explanatory cover. It would seem that every theory regarding the relation between physiological needs and psychological wants must meet such refractory facts to which violence has to be done, as long as we have not solved the body-mind problem. We may feel sure that reality is one in spite of its two-fold aspect, but the formula of the essential unity of the human organism is but a methodological device which may blind us to the unsolved problem, that it has helped us to step over, and that, left behind, will endanger every wider biological and psychological generalization. This functional theory has the great advantage of throwing light in many practical directions, of purposing to be only a fruitful method of approach for a better understanding of human behaviour and not a dogma that supplies an explanation for every phase of mental activity.

Claparède supplies *two laws regarding interest*:

- (a) Law of interest: "Every mode of behaviour is determined by an interest."
- (b) Law of the interest of the moment: "At every moment an organism acts in the direction of its greatest interest" (pages 78, 81).

Generally, mental activity is not directed towards the satisfaction of the existing need, but towards the object that can satisfy this need. The object is experienced in this relation to the need and itself appears as needful and satisfying. Interest is defined as the object experienced in this relation to the need. In this sense interest is the fundamental principle of mental activity; it is the cause of a definite activity among many possible ones. This definite activity is the resultant of the combined activity of the need and the external stimulus; interest is this causal synthesis.

These laws relate to the springs of mental activity. The existing need under the influence of the interest of the moment touches off the reaction which is of importance to the organism at that moment.

There are four other laws that determine the outward form of this reaction at any given moment. Leaving aside the cases of reflexes and instincts in which the connection between the need and the reaction is hereditarily determined, the author considers only the cases of individually acquired forms of behaviour.

(1) Law of reproduction by similarity: "Every need tends to reproduce those reactions or situations which previously have been favourable to its satisfaction, to repeat the mode of behaviour which previously has succeeded in similar circumstances" (page 88). Concerning the much discussed question whether all laws of association can be reduced to the law of contiguity and whether there can be such a thing as association by way of resemblance, the author of perhaps the best book on association is of opinion that all association viewed mechanistically is by contiguity, whereas viewed functionally all association is by similarity.

(2) and (3) The laws of trial and compensatory reactions are well known from the writings of Jennings and Adler, respectively.

(4) Law of functional autonomy : " At every moment of its development, an animal has functional unity, *i.e.*, its capacities of reaction are adapted to its needs " (page 95). These laws form the foundation of the

FUNCTIONAL CONCEPTION OF CHILDHOOD.

The last mentioned law expresses the view that the child is not a homunculus, an imperfect adult either physiologically or mentally, but a being complete in himself. Together with the law of individual differences it forms the charter of childhood, giving the children the right to be treated as children and giving each child the right to be treated as an individual.

There was a time, and for many that time is still, when childhood was regarded as a shortcoming in the economy of nature. Childishness was something even a child had to be ashamed of. Educators tried to shorten this period as much as possible by replacing childish ways by adult ways of thinking and willing. They never attempted to force the physiological pace by giving the child adult food and drink and making him do adult work, but they thought it necessary to force the mental pace : they made them bear mental burdens that stunted their mental growth as much as work in factories stunted their physical growth. Especially since the writings of K. Groos and the rise of Functionalism another view has been gaining ground. Childhood is regarded as a period necessary for the gradual development of mental as well as physical abilities by spontaneous and joyful exercise. Childish ways are no more looked askance at, but are respected, favoured and made use of as indispensable means of harmonious and healthy growth. We tend to allow childhood and its ways a place of its own in the span of human life, and do not try to hamper the playful acting and thinking of the child by forcing him into the strait-jacket of the adult. We have made an endeavour of understanding the child's thoughts and volitions to foster this activity so that by behaving as a child he may in due time behave as an adult. This attitude makes it incumbent on Psychologists and Educationists to study the laws that govern the development of capacities in the growing human being in his successive stages of first and second infancy, adolescence and puberty. There is then a chance that by avoiding undue interference with this natural evolution we may avoid the growing of " forced fruits having neither ripeness nor savoury ", as Rousseau remarks in *Émile*.

Claparède states three laws which concern this development :

(1) Law of genetic succession : The child naturally develops in passing through successive stages which succeed one another in constant order. These stages are the same as those through which the mind of humanity has passed. Therefore, education must conform to the progress of mental evolution (page 106).

(2) Law of functional and genetic exercise :

(a) The exercise of a function is the condition of its development (page 12). The play-tendency is what makes this preparatory exercise possible ; as Groos has said, " Animals do not play because they are young, but are young that they may play ".

(b) Certain functions cannot be developed, unless other functions which are assigned by nature to a previous stage have been developed (page 114).

(3) Law of functional adaptation : That an individual may become active in a certain way, he must be placed in an environment of such a nature that it will arouse the need which that activity will satisfy (page 116).

This is the fundamental pedagogical principle : the prime mover in all learning is present interest.

If before beginning to teach one creates an intellectual need, the child spontaneously works towards its satisfaction : there is indeed no other way ; for learning is never infusion but always an active reaching out towards what is offered and active assimilation. To force a child to pay attention and learn can produce no such assimilation. Educationists begin to take to heart the

old saying of Montaigne, "One should give nothing but what tempts the appetite or the result is donkeys loaded with books".

The functional conception of childhood and education necessitates therefore the study of the needs and natural interests of children to enable the teacher to direct them towards the subjects to be learned. Faculty Psychologists postulated a number of autonomous capacities, each governing our activities in a domain of its own. To be active in a certain direction it was sufficient for the self to appeal to or command the faculty concerned: the result was supposed to be proportional mainly to the will-power of the individual self. If then an individual did not succeed, it was his own fault, the self had not sufficient will-power to command his learning faculties to bestir themselves. This insufficiency could be remedied by the influence of the master through encouragement or punishment. Functional Psychology considers these capacities not as entities existing in themselves but as mere instruments of action which are born of and find the cause of their being in the need of the moment. The only method of making a child attend is to create in him a felt need to attend. It is evident that the need and attention will be greatest when the interest relates immediately to the object to be attended to, either as goal or as means to a desired goal. A threatening command can by its nature arouse a much less dynamic attitude, because it creates a need having no direct, but only a devious relation to the object, the need being principally directed towards avoiding an unpleasant situation. An indirect need resulting from external constraint, whether persuasion or threat, imitative admiration and submission or fear, always seems less dynamic in regard of an object to be learned than a subjectively arising intellectual need connected with it in the direct and shortest way. All would agree that it is most important for the educator to create this direct interest in the object. Yet the indirect interest is the one that for centuries has been most used.

Functional education is based on this fundamental principle, that "the activity of a pupil should never be anything else but a means used by him to satisfy a need which the educator has been able to arouse in him" (page 186). It is perhaps more clearly expressed in the oft quoted remark of Anatole France, "The art of teaching is nothing but the art of awakening curiosity in young souls in order to satisfy it afterwards; and curiosity is only lively and healthy in happy minds". It links together the two main factors emphasized by functional educationists, direct interest and joyful or play activity.

In autocratic and militaristic times men, turned into human machines by enforced drill in church, school and barrack, obeying commands without asking questions, may have been considered desirable members of such a society. In democratic times when an attempt is made to do justice to each individual considered primarily as an end in himself and not a means of increasing the power of the state or the population of heaven, the tendency is to educate beings whose actions are intrinsically motivated by goals which for them have personal meaning and value. "But in accustoming the child to work only by command, without having obtained his consent to the effort to be made, without having established in his mind a rational and affective connection between the effort and the goal to be attained, we break up the complex of factors, the unity of which is indispensable for the smooth functioning of the organism as a whole, and we make of the child an automaton who perhaps knows how to obey but does not know how to will" (page 189). The professor of free Geneva grows eloquent on the topic of democracy. Democracy is not a state that will actually exist in perfection; it is an ideal that we can ever more and more realize. Like the kingdom of heaven it may be said to be within us; we have it in us to realize it by individual and collective effort. "It is a social work, the success of which depends upon individual good will, individual sacrifices freely accepted, a constant endeavour of mutual understanding and tolerance. Democracy is not a stable condition, an inert form acquired once for all, something static. On the contrary it is the resultant of processes essentially dynamic. From the citizen it requires

an uninterrupted unfolding of energy directed towards higher goals, a continual victory of the individual over himself in the interest of the community ; from the community it requires the constant care to assure the free development of these individual energies, of these personal values, from which ultimately must result common happiness " (page 215).

It is the mission of the teacher to help the children of the nation to realize as citizens the democratic spirit that lies ready to be awakened and matured in their idealistic hearts. The author successfully shows that education, as it actually exists even in an old democratic country like Switzerland, is still anti-democratic, and that to fulfil his mission the teacher must inspire himself with the functional conception of education. Education must be a progressive adaptation of mental processes to certain activities arising out of present needs : the motive of learning must not be fear of punishment, desire of rewards or sense of obedience, but deep interest for the thing that has to be done or assimilated. The school must have an activity programme in the sense that it must enlist the spontaneous activity of the child ; it must therefore be a laboratory rather than an auditorium. The period of childhood with its spirit of play must not be shortened. The aim of education must be the development of intellectual and moral functions rather than the stuffing of the mind with a mass of knowledge that most often remains but a dead weight without relation to actual life.

The theory is easy but the practice difficult. For the last thirty years educators everywhere have been influenced by the point of view of Functional Psychology. In English speaking countries we find schools with play methods, schools run on the Dalton Laboratory Plan, schools with an activity programme ; on the Continent there are schools known as *École active*, *Arbeitsschule* and *Tatschule*. The terminology has often given rise to misunderstandings. The use of the English term play-way, rests on the distinction between the playful activity of the child and the bread-and-butter work of the adult. It lays itself open to be ridiculed as " the primrose path " by the " good old grinders ". The Germans, on the contrary, used the term *Arbeit* (work) to characterize the new system, because of the distinction between knowledge gained through actual practical work and mere bookish knowledge ; it has given rise to the misconception that these schools are of the manual training type. The term activity has often been mistaken to mean mere external activity instead of internal spontaneous or self-activity. To have a school based on the principles of Functional Psychology it is not sufficient to have manual work, laboratory work, dramatization, miniature adult life or even actual participation in the real life of the town's banks, post-offices, shops, etc. " Functional education is an education based on needs : need of knowing, need of searching, need of looking, need of working. The need, the interest resulting from the need, this is the factor that will transform a reaction into a true act " (page 195). The law of interest is the one cardinal point around which must turn the whole system. The teacher must study the child's interests and forms of activity, since they are not a miniature of those of the adult. These interests must be exploited by directing them towards the things that have to be learned. " The art of teaching must transform the future goals aimed at by scholastic programmes into present interests for the child " (page 253). It is clear that children should not be allowed to do whatever they like ; they should be made to like whatever they have to do.

Any curriculum may be followed in the spirit of functional education, provided the subjects are not essentially foreign to the developing life of the child, and are amenable to become goals of the re-directed desires of the child. It does not follow that because a form of external activity is part of adult life that it is also an activity for which the child has a personal need. Again, a pupil studying an abstruse problem of mathematics without any immediate bearing on real life may be very active in this functional sense, whereas a pupil tiring himself out whilst on a geographical excursion may have no such activity.

The main instrument the teacher has at his disposal to create in children interest for scholastic tasks, is the children's natural tendency to play, understood in the wide sense explained in the author's "Experimental Pedagogy", pages 129-138. "Play and attractiveness ought to be the pivot of all education" (*ib.*, page 158). This is the view tersely expressed by Rollin, "What we want to get is will, and it is gained by sweetness, persuasion and especially by the attraction of pleasure".

To the teacher interested in an Educational Psychology different from that found in many old and new books, in which interest is not even mentioned, this book, together with the same author's "Experimental Pedagogy", will be of the greatest help to gain new and stimulating viewpoints on this difficult, but to him most important, subject. The teacher who feels impatient at the number of psychological theories should remember that "*le propre de la science est de toujours changer*". Il n'y a que l'ignorance et la routine qui restent bêtement immobiles" (page 192).

P. M. BACHELARD, Ph.D.

LIFE AND BEAUTY : A SPIRITUAL AUTOBIOGRAPHY. By P. W. Robertson. London : Edward Arnold. Price : 6s.

This book, though by no means a psychological or philosophical treatise, is yet of exceptional interest to the student of modern psychology and even more particularly to the student of æsthetic. It is in fact, from several points, of more than usual interest to readers of this Journal. The author is a professor at a New Zealand university college and those who have any regard for literature will welcome his book as a distinguished contribution to the admittedly limited output of books of any high degree of merit by those born in New Zealand. The nature of Professor Robertson's book—it is an intimate autobiography of the spirit—is of special interest also to those born or living in the British Dominions, in that it tells of the early responses of a sensitive mind to life in New Zealand, the enrichment of that mind through experiences in England, the European countries and the East, and the return of the author to New Zealand in his maturity. Professor Robertson tells particularly of the search for beauty throughout his life and analyses and reconstructs this search and discovery. Keenly sensitive to beauty and, as a scientist, for many years seeking to discover its meaning, he has reached a solution of the problem through the discoveries of modern psychology.

It is not, however, that the author makes mechanical use of these discoveries. In applying them to his own life and in testing them by his own experience, he has in turn illuminated the concepts themselves. The psychologist will thus find that his conceptions, instead of being treated in the abstract and schematic fashion so characteristic of the text-book, are here related to the actual experience of a living mind. This applies particularly to the concepts of intellect and emotion, to the intimate relation between emotion and image, which the author appears willing even to identify under certain conditions, to the determining significance of early experience, and the idea of repetition-compulsion. Beauty is thus related to life, the manner of its apprehension by an individual mind is made clear, and the outcome is a striking contribution to the theory of the creation and the appreciation of the beautiful.

It will be generally admitted that treatises on æsthetic by the great philosophers of the past strike us today as, for the most part, abstract, unreal and inadequate for the understanding of this rich and extensive form of human experience. Even more does one feel this about the æsthetic theories of the lesser philosophers of the present day. Modern psychology clearly offers us a new and illuminating approach to the problem. The offer has, however, by no means been fully accepted. Resistances have been set up and many writers on æsthetic, when they do not treat Freudianism with angry dismissal, still regard it with a kind of petulant superiority. There have of course been books which have made a psychological approach to the problem, such books,

for example, as Richards's "Principles of Literary Criticism" and Ogden and Richards's "Foundations of *Æsthetics*"; also such brilliant psychoanalytical studies of individual artists as Krutch's book on Poe and Baudouin's study of Verhaeren in his "Psychoanalysis and *Æsthetics*". But one can think of no systematic treatment of the æsthetic problem which shows a full appreciation of the significance of modern psychology; thus one feels more and more strongly that the thing should be done. It is this fact which makes Professor Robertson's book specially interesting from this point of view and makes one hope that the autobiography, beautiful in itself, may be followed by a systematic work on æsthetic.

The writer has felt the truth of the main doctrines of the Freudian theory, found truth also in some of the ideas of Jung, indicated a link between psychoanalysis and the theory of Gestalt and, if his book is carefully studied, there is clearly implicit in it a fresh and vital treatment of the whole æsthetic problem. This might be formulated somewhat as follows. The conceptions of the unconscious and of mental conflict are taken as fundamental, and the latter is conceptualized as the conflict between emotion and intellect. The artist is found to obtain release from his conflicts by remodulating his disharmonies into new orders of life. These he feels impelled, in greater or less degree, to communicate to his fellows. The physical medium in which his art appears is determined by his very early environment and, to a lesser degree, by heredity. A sensitivity to the medium is the special attribute of the artist. In his creations there appear, perhaps in a concealed form, materials drawn from early experience which have persisted in the unconscious and been re-activated by later situations. Professor Robertson makes very clear the significance, in the artistic process, of the mental patterns, that is, the emotions and images of childhood and their re-arousal in the later years. This conception of specially significant mental configurations he has linked up with the Freudian idea of repetition-compulsion and convincingly illustrated. Incidentally, the psychologist will find here interesting first-hand material, and some new light on the problem of memory. The spectator of the work of art, in so far as communication is complete, understands and feels the conflict of the artist as if it were his own, feels the reality of the work of art and so, in his turn, experiences that heightened awareness of life and that sense of release which was felt by its creator. On the vexed question of form and content in the work of art, the author finds that form is dictated by the emotion, is determined by the unconscious pattern, and he offers an acute and telling criticism of all intellectualist theories of art.

There is evident throughout this book a wide awareness and a sensitive appreciation of the various arts and their modern developments. Professor Robertson writes with a vigour and clarity of expression, has an unusually subtle and happy feeling for the right word, and at times gives us passages of lyrical beauty. Apart from its significance for scientific theory, this is a book to be read with interest and delight.

I. L. G. SUTHERLAND.

AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE UNDERSTANDING, KNOWLEDGE, OPINION, AND ASSENT. By John Locke. Edited with an Introduction by Benjamin Rand, Ph.D., LL.D., Harvard University, Cambridge (Mass.). Harvard University Press. 1931.

The present work provides the second important instalment to be edited by Dr. Rand of the manuscripts bequeathed by Locke to his cousin Peter King, the Lord Chancellor. It comprises the original draft of the "Essay concerning Human Understanding", which first appeared complete in 1690. This draft, which Locke took with him into his exile in 1683, and whose elaboration provided his chief occupation while abroad, bears the date 1671. This would seem to dispose of the suggestion drawn from the letter to Edward Clarke of 1686, published at page 177 in Dr. Rand's former work "The

Correspondence of Locke and Clarke" (reviewed in this Journal, Vol. VII, page 75), that the date of the famous "accidental discourse" among friends which set Locke upon the systematic examination of the powers of the human understanding would have to be advanced to 1681 or 1682. It would now seem that the date hitherto accepted—about 1670—will stand.

The present volume makes a most important contribution to the facilities for the study of Locke's great work. It not only fixes the period of the preparation of the "Essay", but it provides the material necessary to the student or teacher who would attempt to trace a development in Locke's philosophical thinking. This result is secured partly by a useful system of references between the numbered sections of the "draft" here printed and the books, chapters and sections of the "Essay" as published in its first edition. In the second place Dr. Rand contributes, in an Introduction of about 50 pages in length, a complete analysis of the argument in the draft with reference to the main outlines of the final work. He explains the differences of order in the two treatments, and how the division of the four books in our "Essay" arose.

The general effect of his work is to bring out the fact that there is no appreciable change in Locke's philosophical views from the time of their first being "set down against our next meeting", and that his most characteristic doctrines are already mature in the draft. In the "Essay" which we know there is, however, in addition to the formation of the separate "Books" with changes in the order of exposition through development under revision and re-writing, a greater elaboration of certain points and applications of the argument to fresh topics. The results of Dr. Rand's researches go wholly to confirm Fraser's statement in his edition of the "Essay" that "the investigations proper to the Fourth Book were those which engaged Locke at the outset". Locke's fundamental problem throughout is, in Dr. Rand's words, that of "the extent and validity of our knowledge as conversant only about our ideas". Dr. Rand shows how the "Fourth Book" arose from the collocation into a single treatise of the various portions of the "draft" wherein Locke from time to time pauses to sum up the bearing upon the central subject of his interest, the validity of knowledge, of what he has said on the topics just discussed. Their position as summaries dictated its position as the concluding section of the work in its final form.

This question of whether Locke is to be regarded as an epistemologist and "critical philosopher before Kant", or as the precursor of associational psychology whose characteristic principles are chiefly to be derived from a study of the account of the "origin of ideas" in Book II, no doubt continues to be debated in many a philosophical class-room. It belongs to the palmy days of the distinction between the origin and the validity of knowledge, when it was supposed that there was room for two distinct and equally scientific accounts of knowledge: the philosophical, and that provided by the "natural science" of psychology. These were the days of the neat and tidy "division of labour" theory, when a Pringle-Pattison (I think it was) could write that speculative philosophy could swallow the whole of associationalist psychology without turning a hair (or words to that effect). Today we are in perhaps a better position to see how far this "division of labour" notion was the result of philosophers letting themselves be intimidated by "scientists", especially of the "psychological" sort. Nowadays "scientific psychologists" are no longer interested in the "association of ideas", and the intimidation has taken other forms. But there is no further excuse for the study of Locke under any other presupposition than that the "psychological" or "physiological" attempt to provide an account of "the origin of ideas" in itself and *ipso facto* constitutes and commits us to a theory of the validity of knowledge.

The externals of this volume reflect much credit upon the publishers, the Harvard Press, and upon its printers, the Oxford University Press, London. One may express the hope that it will be used for the purposes for which it

has been produced, and not made in Colleges the substitute for "the" Essay, which its comparative brevity, its readableness, and its conformity in doctrine with the major work might well conspire to make it.

W. ANDERSON.

JOURNALS RECEIVED.

MIND. A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy. Macmillan & Co., London. Annual subscription: 16s.

Vol. XLI. No. 161. January, 1932. Probability: The Relations of Proposal to Supposal: W. E. Johnson. Kant's First Moral Principle: G. C. Field. Mathematics and Dialectic in *The Republic* VI-VII (I): F. M. Cornford. The Value of Formal Logic: F. C. S. Schiller. Two Problems about Duty (I): W. A. Pickard-Cambridge.

PHILOSOPHY. Journal of the British Institute of Philosophy. Published quarterly. Macmillan & Co., London. Annual subscription: 14s.

Vol. VII. No. 25. January, 1932. The Mathematical Aspect of the Universe: Sir James Jeans. Poetry and Prose in the Arts (I): Professor S. Alexander. Man the Measure of All Things (I): P. S. Burrell. Renouvier—The Man and His Work: Professor J. A. Gunn. The New Cosmology in its Historical Aspect: Professor T. M. Forsyth. Real and Apparent Value: Professor R. B. Perry. Tradition: Michael Kaye.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY. Published fortnightly. Columbia University. Annual subscription: 4 dollars.

Vol. XXVIII. No. 23. November 5, 1931. Superstition: Alexander Lesser. The Conception of Life as Entelechy: J. A. Lynch. No. 25. December 3. A Definition of Value: John R. Reid. No. 26. December 17. Biological Relativity: Oliver L. Reiser. On the Meaning of a Proposition: A. Ushenko. Vol. XXIX. No. 1. January 7, 1932. Reason and Nature: Metaphysics of Scientific Method: Sidney Hook.

PSYCHE. Published quarterly. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., London. Price: 5s.

Vol. XII. No. 2. October, 1931. The Bentham Centenary: Editorial. Contemporary Philosophy in Soviet Russia: Lancelot Hogben. The Reification of Projective Geometry: Scott Buchanan. Symbolism as a Mental Process: Ursula Hope McConnell. Sociological Factors which Influenced the Suicide Rate: Maurice B. Wright. A Practical Mental Health Program: Howard Becker. Some Japanese Borrowings: P. M. and A. P. Rossiter.

ARCHIVES DE PSYCHOLOGIE. Edited by Ed. Claparède. Kundig, Geneva. Annual subscription: 15 francs.

Vol. XXIII. No. 90. August, 1931. Les Images dans l'œuvre de M. Bergson: Jeanne Hersch. Les Mouvements stroboscopiques chez les Enfants: R. Meili et E. Tobler. L'Instinct Maternel de la Souris: André Réy. La Courbe de Croissance et la Détermination Inductive des Éléments Psychologiques: S. A. Courtis. Le Test de Dearborn: Marie Pedersen.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS. Baillière, Tindall & Cox, London. Annual subscription: 30s.

Vol. XII. Part 4. The Therapeutic Effect of Inexact Interpretation: Edward Glover. Specific Forms of the Œdipus Complex: Otto Fenichel. History of the Œdipus Complex: Felix Boehn. The Characterological Mastery of the Œdipus Complex: Wilhelm Reich. Child-Analysis in the Analysis of Adults: S. Ferenczi. Some Psychological Aspects of a Fox-hunting Rite: Ingeborg Flügel.

JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. Published quarterly. Clark University Press. Annual subscription: 7 dollars.

Vol. II. No. 4. November, 1931. Some Notes on the Census of Religious Bodies, 1926: Raymond Pearl. Psychological Studies of Motion Pictures, Part V: H. S. Conrad and Harold E. Jones. Versatility of Genius: R. K. White. Vol. III. No. 1. February, 1932. A Scale of Emotional Maturity: R. R. Willoughby. A Study of the Questions of Young Children Concerning Sex: Katherine W. Hattendorf. The Problem of Criminality in Children: G. C. Ferrari. A Scale for Measuring Persistence: K. C. A. Wang.

JOURNAL OF GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY. Published quarterly. Clark University Press. Annual subscription: 7 dollars.

Vol. XXXIX. No. 4. December, 1931. Characteristics and Relations of Motor Speed: A. I. Gates and A. W. Scott. A Preliminary Study of the Effect of Delayed Punishment on Learning in the White Rat: C. J. Warden and S. Diamond. Visual Apprehension in the Maze Behaviour of Normal and Feeble-minded Children: Sante de Sanctis. The Factor of General Orientation in Maze Learning in the White Rat: C. J. Warden and F. R. Fox. Can Conditioned Responses be Established in the New-born Infant?: D. P. Marquis.

PACIFIC AFFAIRS. Journal of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu. Price: 25 cents per copy.

Vol. IV. No. 12. December, 1931. East Indian Nationalism: A. Vandenbosch. China's Changing Culture: Sophia Chen Zen. Canadian Affairs: H. F. Angus. The China Conference: Elizabeth Green.

THE HUMAN FACTOR. Published monthly. Formerly the Journal of the National Institute of Industrial Psychology, London. Annual subscription: £1.

Vol. VI. No. 1. January, 1932. Some Personal Factors in Industrial Efficiency: S. Wyatt. Time Experiments on Hoeing: N. Balchin. The Selection of Salesmen. The Australian Institute of Industrial Psychology.

REVUE DE L'INSTITUT DE SOCIOLOGIE. Parc Léopold, Brussels. Annual subscription: 100 francs.

Vol. XI. No. 2. April-June, 1931. Le Langage du bas-peuple et le moi inférieur des individus et des sociétés (I): A. Niceforo. Certains Aspects du Problème Social au Congo Belge: A. Marzorati. Les Organismes de Recherches et d'Enquêtes en Matière d'Administration Municipale aux Etats-Unis: J. Lespes. Chronique du Mouvement Scientifique.

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA. Catholic University del Sacro Cuore, Milan. Annual subscription: 40-30 lire.

Vol. XXIII. Nos. 4 and 5. July-October, 1931. La filosofia dell'arte di G. Gentile: Mariano Campo. L'ambiente e le fonti nel pensiero di A. Schopenhauer: U. A. Padovani. Leibnize Blondel: F. Olgiati. A quali fonti Abbia della filosofia di Kant: E. D. Carlo. Catalogo dei Manoscritti Egidiani Romani: G. Bruni. Vol. XXIII. No. 6. November-December, 1931. Etica e metafisica nel pensiero di Seneca: M. Gentile. La posizione di Rolando da Cremona: E. Preto. L'autoconsapevolezza e la dimostrazione del libero arbitrio in S. Tommaso d'Aquino: F. Olgiati. La psicologia averroistica di Taddeo da Parma: S. V. Rovighi. La nozione di misura nella concezione metafisico-scientifica di Nicolò di Cusa: P. Rotta. La concezione scolastica e la concezione Schopenhauriana della Storia: U. A. Padovani. Intorno al principio di Causalità: A. Masnovo. La rinuncia al determinismo fisico dei fenomeni elementari e le teorie meccaniciste: P. Rossi. I principi della pedagogia: M. Casotti. Shakespeare in rapporto alla religione e alla morale: F. Olivero.

THE ECONOMIC RECORD. Journal of the Economic Society of Australia and New Zealand. Melbourne University Press. Published half-yearly. Price : 5s.

Vol. VII. No. 13. November, 1931. Financial Reconstruction : F. A. Bland and R. C. Mills. Some Economic Aspects of Grazing and Pasture Management in Australia : S. M. Wadham. Australian Monetary Policy Reviewed : R. Wilson. The Federal Income Tax Acts, 1915-1931 : H. S. Carslaw. Scourging the Money Changers : E. C. Dyason. Public Finance and Depression in New Zealand : A. H. Tocker. The Doctrine of Rationalisation : F. R. E. Mauldon. Reports of the Sugar Enquiry Committee : J. M. Garland. Business Conditions in Victoria.

THE AUSTRALIAN INTERCOLLEGIAN. Published monthly by Australian Student Christian Movement, 182 Collins Street, Melbourne. Annual subscription : 5s.

THE MEDICAL JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA. Published weekly. The Printing House, Seamer Street, Glebe, Sydney. Price : 1s.

NOTES AND NEWS.

We regret to announce the death of one of our esteemed and oldest members in England, Professor Carveth Read, who died on December 6th, at the age of 83 years. His death was due to cerebral hæmorrhage. He was Emeritus Professor of Philosophy and Comparative Psychology in the University of London. His earlier publications were concerned with logic and metaphysics, but his later interests were directed to human origins and their psychology. Professor Read showed a constant interest in this Journal from its inception, being one of its first overseas subscribers ; he constantly wrote encouraging letters in regard to the work it was achieving. Not only will his loss be regretted overseas, but all those connected with this Journal cannot but feel and deeply regret the loss of a co-worker in the cause of science and philosophy.

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The office-bearers of the Association for 1932 are as follows : President : Mr. W. A. Merrylees (Melbourne) ; Editor of the Journal : Professor H. Tasman Lovell (Sydney) ; Vice-Presidents : Professors J. Anderson (Sydney), W. Anderson (Auckland), W. R. Boyce Gibson (Melbourne), J. A. Gunn (Melbourne), T. A. Hunter (Wellington), Dr. A. H. Martin (Sydney), Professors E. Morris Miller (Hobart), and J. McKellar Stewart (Adelaide) ; Hon. General Secretary : Mr. G. F. McIntosh ; Hon. Business Secretary : Mr. E. Lund ; Hon. Treasurer : Dr. C. R. McRae ; Hon. Counsel : Mr. C. M. Collins ; Hon. Auditor : Mr. G. Bruce Rainsford.

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We regret to announce the illness of the Editor, Professor H. Tasman Lovell. He was recently operated upon for appendicitis and is making satisfactory progress toward recovery.